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ABSTRACT
The current research examined the effects of perceptions of organizational politics,
understanding of organizational processes, and control over organizational events on
rater attitudes (i.e., acceptance, cost-benefit evaluations) toward multisource feedback
systems (MSFS). Six-hundred-and-three employees were surveyed concerning their
perceptions of organizational politics, understanding, control, and rater attitudes toward
MSFS. The present research demonstrated that (a) understanding interacted with
organizational politics perceptions in the prediction of rater acceptance of MSFS, (b)
control moderated the relationship between understanding and rater attitudes toward
peer feedback, (c) perceptions of organizational politics were consistently negatively
related to the favorability of rater attitudes toward MSFS, (d) participants reported the
most positive attitudes for providing supervisor feedback, followed by subordinate
feedback, followed by peer feedback, and (e) individuals with prior experience with
MSFS reported more positive attitudes toward MSFS than did individuals without prior
experience with these systems. Contributions, limitations, and potential avenues for
future research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, organizations have used supervisors as the sole agents for
providing formal performance feedback (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). However, over
the past two decades the use of multisource feedback systems (MSFS), often referred to
as 360-degree feedback systems, has increased (Church & Bracken, 1997; Harris &
Schaubroeck, 1988; London & Smithers, 1995; Wohlers & London, 1989). MSFS
involve collecting performance feedback about an employee from relevant
organizational others (e.g., supervisors, peers, subordinates) (Funderburg & Levy,
1997). Proponents suggest several advantages of using multisource feedback compared
to feedback from a single source: higher quality feedback (Wexley & Klomoski, 1984),
improved ratee performance (Tornow, 1993), higher levels of employee empowerment
(Cotton, 1993; London & Beatty, 1993; Ludeman, 1993; Moravec, Gyr, & Friedman,
1993), reduced biases involved with single-source ratings (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984;
Murphy & Cleveland, 1991), and enhanced reliability and fairness of performance
ratings (Harris & Shaubroeck, 1988).
Although there are several potential benefits associated with MSFS, the
feedback system must be accepted by its users if it is going to be successful (Bernardin,
Dahmus, & Redmon, 1993; Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Carroll & Schneier, 1982).
Accordingly, it is important to identify factors that influence user attitudes regarding
MSFS (Funderburg & Levy, 1997). While past research has attempted to accomplish
this objective by focusing on ratees (e.g., Antonioni, 1994; Bernardin et al., 1993;
Maurer & Tarulli, 1996), relatively little research attention has focused on rater
attitudes. Rater attitudes likely impact the effectiveness of MSFS because raters who
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hold negative attitudes may refuse to participate, provide inaccurate ratings, or attempt
to manipulate the system to secure their own self-interests (Fedor, Bettenhausen, &
Davis, 1999). Thus, research designed to identify the factors that impact rater attitudes
is needed so that factors that enhance multisource feedback system effectiveness may be
augmented and those that hinder it may be minimized.
Several researchers have suggested that one potential determinant of rater
attitudes toward feedback systems may be organizational politics (cf. Bernardin &
Beatty, 1984; Fedor et al., 1999). To date, however, research has not examined whether
perceptions of organizational politics are related to how raters feel about providing
performance evaluations for their subordinates, coworkers, and supervisors. Thus, the
purpose of the current research is to examine the relationships between organizational
politics perceptions and rater attitudes toward MSFS.
This paper first discusses the state of the current research literature surrounding
the use of MSFS. Second, it defines organizational politics perceptions and discusses
its relationships with important organizational outcomes. Third, the hypothesized
relationships between organizational politics perceptions and rater attitudes regarding
MSFS are delineated. Fourth, the method used to test the hypotheses is outlined. Fifth,
results of the current research are presented. Finally, contributions and limitations of
the current research, as well as areas for future research, are discussed.
Multisource Feedback Systems
Traditionally, formal performance appraisal systems have relied almost
exclusively on supervisor ratings of subordinate performance (i.e., supervisor feedback)
(Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). Over the past two decades, however, there has been a
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sustained shift away from traditional performance appraisal systems toward systems
that utilize more than one rater source. These systems generally include feedback from
supervisors, peers, and subordinates, although other feedback sources are sometimes
included (e.g., self ratings, customer ratings, client ratings). Since the 1980s, the use of
non-traditional or alternative rating sources (i.e., peer feedback, subordinate feedback)
has increased steadily (Church & Bracken, 1997; Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988; London
& Smithers, 1995; Wohlers & London, 1989). Today, more than 95 percent of Fortune
2000 companies report that they use some form of multisource feedback somewhere
within their organizations (Edwards & Ewen, 1998, as cited in Ewen & Edwards, 2001).
Further, Hedge and Borman (1995) argue that, due to rapid technological advances and
our evolving conceptions of the work environment, the use of MSFS is likely to become
a necessity in the future.
The central premise underlying the use of MSFS is that by utilizing multiple
rater sources, the amount of relevant, valid information provided to ratees is increased
(Ashford, 1993; Borman, 1998; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Proponents of MSFS
argue that providing multiple perspectives of ratee performance is likely to increase the
ratee’s self-awareness (Borman, 1998; Conway & Huffcutt, 1997; Ghorpade, 2000;
Mohrman, Resnick-West, & Lawler, 1989; Tornow, 1993), which facilitates improved
performance (Ashford, 1989; Church, 1997; Tornow, 1993). There are several
mechanisms by which MSFS are theorized to increase ratee self-awareness. First,
MSFS provide the ratee with substantially more information than traditional single rater
systems (Lawler, 1967). Second, alternative rater sources (i.e., peers, subordinates) are
often in a better position to evaluate job performance than an incument’s immediate
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supervisor (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Third, each rater source provides a valid and
unique perspective on ratee performance (Borman, 1991). Accordingly, because MSFS
are assumed to provide ratees with considerably more unique performance information
than single-rater systems, ratee self-awareness should be increased and decision quality
should be improved.
Unfortunately, the current research literature concerning the effectiveness of
MSFS has several severe limitations. First, very little research has investigated the
impact of complete MSFS. That is, alternative rater sources generally have been
evaluated independently (i.e., subordinate feedback, peer feedback). Second, nearly all
of the research conducted to date has focused on subordinate feedback, with very little
research examining the effectiveness of peer feedback (Smither & Walker, 2001).
Third, most of the research has used a correlational research design rather than an
experimental research design (i.e., control groups) (Smither & Walker, 2001).
Acknowledging these limitations, research on the effectiveness of MSFS
generally has been supportive. For example, research has consistently demonstrated
that subordinate feedback is related to improvements in supervisor performance as
perceived by those who provide the feedback (i.e., subordinates) (e.g., Atwater, Roush,
& Fischthal, 1995; Bernardin, Hagen, Ross, & Kane, 1995, as cited in Smither &
Walker, 2001; Hegarty, 1974). Further, supervisors who receive the lowest ratings were
found to have the greatest improvement and these improvements could not be explained
solely due to regression to the mean (Reilly, Smither, & Vasilopoulos, 1996; Smither et
al., 1995; Walker & Smither, 1999). More importantly, longitudinal studies have
documented that these performance increases are sustained over time (Bernardin et al.,
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1995; Reilly et al., 1996; Walker and Smither, 1999). Although most of this research
failed to use a control group, studies that have used an experimental design have found
performance improvements for supervisors who receive subordinate feedback, while
supervisors who do not receive subordinate feedback did not improve their performance
(Atwater et al., 2000, as cited in Smither & Walker, 2001; Hegarty, 1974). Thus,
research has shown considerable support for the effectiveness of subordinate feedback.
Research on peer feedback also has been supportive. In fact, peer feedback was
suggested as an effective means of evaluating performance as far back as the 1930s
(Scott, 1932). Walter Dill Scott, one of the founders of industrial/organizational
psychology, argued that while supervisor ratings should be used to assess dimensions
such as personality, originality, leadership, and technical ability, peer ratings would be
an effective means of assessing ability to learn, industriousness, initiative, and
knowledge of work. Over a decade later, Williams and Leavitt (1947) concluded that
peer ratings were a better predictor of success in officer candidate school then objective
tests and were better predictors of future performance than were supervisor ratings.
More recently, research evaluating the psychometric properties of peer ratings suggests
that peer ratings are statistically reliable and account for important performance-related
variance (Borman, White, & Dorsey, 1995; Kane & Lawler, 1978; Lewin & Zwany,
1976). Similarly, Atwater et al. (1998) demonstrated that peer ratings significantly
predicted performance outcomes (as defined by supervisor ratings). Further, Druskat
and Wolff (1999), using a time-series design, found that peer feedback resulted in
increased communication, task motivation, group viability, and group cohesion in
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self-managing work groups. Thus, peer feedback has been found to be an effective
means of evaluating coworker performance.
While research has been consistently supportive of alternative feedback sources,
organizations may differ in their readiness to successfully implement effective MSFS
(Ewen & Edwards, 2001). For successful implementation of MSFS, it is essential that
system users believe that MSFS will result in positive outcomes (Ewen & Edwards,
2001). Fedor et al. (1999) suggested that a potential determinant of rater expectations
concerning the outcomes of participating in MSFS is the level of political behavior
within their organization.
Organizational Politics
After reviewing the organizational politics literature, Kacmar and Baron (1999)
offered the following definition: “organizational politics involves actions by
individuals, which are directed toward the goal of furthering their own self-interests
without regard for the well-being of others or their organization” (p. 4). There is a
growing acknowledgment that politics play a prominent role in organizational policies
and processes (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Frost, 1987; Gandz & Murray, 1980; Gioia &
Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker, Sims, & Gioia, 1987; Parker, Dipboye, & Jackson,
1995; Pfeffer, 1981; Tziner, Latham, Price, & Haccoun, 1996) and likely influence
several important work-related attitudes and behaviors (Kacmar & Carlson, 1997). For
example, organizational politics perceptions have been found to be related to increased
job anxiety (Anderson, 1994; Cropanzano, Howes, Grandey, & Toth, 1997; Ferris et al.,
1996a; Ferris et al., 1996b), reduced job satisfaction (Anderson; Cropanzano et al.,
1997; Ferris et al., 1996a; Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Nye & Witt,
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1993; Parker et al., 1995), reduced satisfaction with supervisor (Drory, 1993; Ferris et
al., 1996b), and increased intent to turnover (Anderson, 1994; Cropanzano et al., 1997).
Research suggests that individuals who perceive high levels of organizational politics
also are likely to enact political behavior themselves (Ferris, Harrell-Cook, &
Dulebohn, 2000), thereby creating a self-perpetuating cycle.
Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) identified two characteristics of organizational
politics that impact its relationships with employee attitudes and behaviors. First,
perceptions of organizational politics are more important than reality (Ferris et al.,
1989). Gandz and Murray (1980) suggested that organizational politics should be
viewed as a subjective assessment rather than as an objective state. After all, Lewin
(1936) noted many years ago that people respond to their perceptions of a situation,
which may be different from the situation itself. Thus, perceptions of organizational
politics should be the focus of politics research, even if these perceptions represent
inaccurate depictions of the actual organizational environment (Porter, 1976, as cited in
Ferris et al., 1996b).
The second characteristic of organizational politics that influences its
relationship with important organizational and individual variables is that organizational
politics may be interpreted as either beneficial or detrimental to an individual’s wellbeing (Ferris et al., 1989). As such, organizational policies and practices that are
viewed as highly political can provide situations of potential gain (i.e., opportunity) as
well as potential loss (i.e., threats) (Ferris et al., 1996b). For example, research suggests
that for many individuals, organizational politics are perceived as a threat to their wellbeing (Baum, 1989; Cropanzano et al., 1997) and result in a variety of negative

7

affective reactions (e.g., increased job anxiety, reduced job satisfaction) (Kacmar &
Baron, 1999). However, some individuals may perceive organizational politics as an
opportunity to advance their self-interests, which may result in positive affective
reactions (Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris et al., 1989). Thus, organizational politics
perceptions are likely to result in differing responses to organizational policies and
practices depending on whether politics are viewed as an opportunity or a threat.
Organizational Politics and MSFS
Performance appraisal is one organizational practice in which employee
attitudes are likely to be influenced by organizational politics (Ferris et al., 1989).
Research consistently demonstrates that both supervisors and subordinates use the
performance appraisal process to accomplish political goals (Ferris et al., 1989; Gioia &
Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al., 1987; Riley, 1983). For example, supervisors
may give higher than warranted ratings to avoid confrontations with subordinates (Gioia
& Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al., 1987). Conversely, subordinates may use
impression management tactics to project a false image to supervisors in an attempt to
influence supervisor performance ratings (Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971; Wood &
Mitchell, 1981). Such political manipulation not only reduces the accuracy of
performance ratings but likely impacts user attitudes toward performance feedback
systems (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). Thus, research suggests that the use of supervisor
ratings are likely influenced by organizational politics.
In addition to supervisor ratings, MSFS often use peers and subordinates as rater
sources (Funderberg & Levy, 1997). There are several reasons why peer and
subordinate rater sources also are likely influenced by organizational politics. First,
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research suggests that many employees feel uncomfortable and unqualified when it
comes to providing performance ratings for their supervisors and peers (Bettenhausen &
Fedor, 1997). Unfortunately, these are exactly the types of situations (i.e., uncertain,
ambiguous) in which political behavior is most likely to occur (Ferris et al., 1989).
Second, providing feedback is likely a riskier proposition for alternative rater sources
(i.e., peers, subordinates) than for traditional sources (i.e., supervisors). For example,
peers and subordinates are more vulnerable to reprisals from ratees than are supervisors
(Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997). Accordingly, the political implications of providing
performance ratings are likely more salient for coworkers and subordinates than for
supervisors. Third, coworkers and subordinates may have more to gain from providing
politically motivated feedback than do supervisors. Supervisors are able to influence
subordinates to comply with their wishes on the basis of their authority, control over
rewards, control over punishments, and control over information (French & Raven,
1959). Coworkers and subordinates, on the other hand, have fewer avenues for
influencing others. Consequently, MSFS may provide a welcome opportunity for raters
to ingratiate themselves (i.e., rate politically) to ratees in attempts to attain desired
rewards and resources. Fourth, subordinates often possess little knowledge of
supervisor performance because supervisor responsibilities tend to be fluid, ill-defined,
and ambiguous (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Peers who
work relatively independently may be in a similar situation when required to provide
coworker ratings. As discussed above, when individuals are put in ambiguous or
uncertain situations (e.g., having to provide ratings based on little knowledge of the
ratee’s performance), political behavior likely will result (Ferris et al., 1989). Finally,
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peers and subordinates may be more susceptible to ratee political behavior (e.g.,
ingratiation, impression management) than supervisors because they likely have less
experience and training in evaluating the performance of their coworkers or supervisors,
respectively. Taken together, there are various reasons to expect that rater attitudes,
regardless of organizational level (e.g., supervisors, peers, subordinates), are likely
influenced by organizational politics. Although the current study will investigate the
relationships between organizational politics and rater attitudes regarding MSFS for
each rater source (i.e., supervisor, peer, subordinate), the direction of the relations are
expected to be the same. Therefore, the following discussion treats raters in general.
Organizational Politics and Rater Attitudes Toward Multisource Feedback
Although research has demonstrated that organizational politics impact
traditional performance feedback systems (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et
al., 1987), research has not investigated the relations between organizational politics
and rater attitudes toward MSFS. Organizational politics likely impact rater attitudes in
two ways. First, perceptions of organizational politics within the performance feedback
process likely undermine user acceptance of MSFS (Fedor et al., 1999). Research
suggests that user acceptance is essential for successfully implementing formal
feedback systems (Bernardin et al., 1993; Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Carroll &
Schneier, 1982). Rater acceptance is particularly important because in situations with
low levels of rater acceptance, raters are likely to provide inaccurate performance
ratings designed solely to maximize their personal gains (Fedor et al., 1999). Thus, for
MSFS to operate appropriately, it is essential that raters support and have confidence in
these systems.
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The second way in which organizational politics may impact rater attitudes
regarding MSFS is that rater perceptions of organizational politics are likely to
influence whether MSFS are viewed as opportunities or threats (cf. Ferris et al., 1989).
Regarding multisource appraisal, Bettenhausen and Fedor (1997) found that employees
generally predict that both positive and negative outcomes may result from providing
feedback ratings for their supervisors and coworkers. Potential positive outcomes
include providing quality feedback to recipients, giving employees a sense of
participation in the feedback system, helping employees do their jobs better, and
increasing work unit productivity (Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997). Potential negative
outcomes include jeopardizing working relationships, making employees feel
vulnerable to retribution, creating a popularity contest, undermining supervisor
authority, making coworkers overly concerned about pleasing each other, creating a
situation where the most productive workers are downgraded because of jealousy, and
overstepping the boundary of what employees should do as part of their jobs
(Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997). Thus, raters may focus on the potential benefits or
potential costs of MSFS depending on whether they interpret organizational politics as
an opportunity or as a threat. Ferris et al. (1989) proposed two factors that may shape
the opportunity/threat perception status of organizational politics: understanding and
control.
Understanding. Understanding may be one mechanism by which individuals
define organizational practices as either opportunities or threats (Ferris et al., 1989;
Sutton & Kahn, 1986). Understanding refers to knowledge concerning how and why
things happen in the organizational environment (Kacmar, Bozeman, Carlson, &
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Anthony, 1999; Sutton & Kahn). When understanding is low, organizational politics
are likely to be perceived as a threat because employees will not be able to insulate
themselves from negative consequences (Ferris et al., 1989). However, employees who
understand the politics of their organizations may be able to position themselves to take
advantage of potential opportunities, resulting in less negative affective reactions (cf.
McGrath, 1976). Thus, Ferris et al. argued that understanding moderates organizational
politics perceptions-work outcomes relationships because of how understanding
transforms the interpretation of organizational politics as either opportunities or threats.
Several empirical studies support the contention that understanding moderates
the relations between organizational politics perceptions and a variety of work
outcomes. For example, Ferris et al. (1994) found that for individuals high in
understanding (using organizational tenure as a proxy for understanding), perceptions of
organizational politics were negatively related to job anxiety. However, for individuals
with low levels of understanding, a positive relationship between organizational politics
perceptions and job anxiety was observed. Similarly, in a study that examined the
relationship between organizational politics and absence, organizational politics
perceptions positively related to absence for individuals with low levels of
understanding (operationalized as tenure with supervisor), while no relationship was
found for individuals with higher understanding (Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn, & HarrellCook, 1996). In another study, Ferris et al. (1996b) found that understanding
moderated the relationships between organizational politics perceptions and both job
anxiety and satisfaction with supervisor such that under conditions of higher
understanding, organizational politics demonstrated significantly less negative effects
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on job anxiety and satisfaction with supervisor than when understanding was reported
as being low. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the impact of
organizational politics perceptions on employee work-related attitudes and behaviors is
moderated by employees’ understanding of organizational policies, practices, and
processes.
Based on these findings and extending the rationale presented above, individuals
who understand the processes within their organization might be expected to focus more
on the opportunities provided by MSFS than individuals with low levels of
understanding. These individuals likely will be more accepting of MSFS and perceive
these systems as having more potential benefits and fewer potential costs. Conversely,
individuals with low levels of understanding of the politics within their organizations
likely will concentrate on the potential threats posed by MSFS and be less accepting of
these systems. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H1: Understanding will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater acceptance of multisource feedback
systems, such that under conditions of lower understanding, increases in
perceptions of organizational politics will be associated with lower rater
acceptance of MSFS than under conditions of higher
understanding.
H2: Understanding will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater perceptions of the benefits of multisource
feedback, such that under conditions of lower understanding, increases in
perceptions of organizational politics will be associated with lower rater
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perceptions of the benefits of multisource feedback than under conditions
of higher understanding.
H3: Understanding will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater perceptions of the costs of multisource
feedback, such that under conditions of lower understanding, increases in
perceptions of organizational politics will be associated with higher rater
perceptions of the costs of multisource feedback than under conditions of
higher understanding.
Control. As mentioned above, a second factor that may influence whether
individuals interpret organizational politics as opportunities or threats is control (Ferris
et al., 1989). Control is defined as the extent to which individuals have the ability to
exercise influence over their organizational environment (Ferris et al., 1996b).
Individuals who feel high levels of control within their organization likely expect less
aversive outcomes than those who feel that they have little control (Miller, 1981; Sutton
& Kahn, 1986). Similarly, Ferris et al. (1989) argued that when employees perceive
high levels of organizational politics and feel that they have little control over these
organizational processes, organizational politics likely will be perceived as a threat.
However, if employees feel that they have control over organizational processes,
organizational politics will be perceived as an opportunity to promote their self-interests
(Ferris et al., 1989).
Ferris et al. (1996b) found support for control as a moderator of the relationships
between organizational politics perceptions and job anxiety, job satisfaction, and
satisfaction with supervisor. For example, they found that for individuals who reported
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high levels of control over their work environment, perceptions of organizational
politics were related with less job anxiety than for individuals who reported lower levels
of control. Similarly, organizational politics perceptions were more negatively related
to job satisfaction for individuals with low levels of control than for individuals with
high levels of control. Finally, for individuals with low control, perceptions of
organizational politics were related with lower levels of satisfaction with supervisor
than for individuals with high control. These results led the authors to propose that
perceived control serves as an “antidote” to the potentially stressful effects of
organizational politics (pp. 253-54).
Again, based on these findings and the theoretical rationale presented above,
individuals who feel a sense of control over organizational processes are likely to feel
less threatened by the potential costs of providing ratings for their supervisors and peers
and have less negative reactions to MSFS than those who do not. Conversely,
individuals who perceive their organizations as being highly political and feel little
control over organizational events likely will focus on the costs (as opposed to the
benefits) of MSFS and be less accepting of these systems. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Control will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater acceptance of multisource feedback
systems, such that under conditions of lower control, increases in
perceptions of organizational politics will be associated with lower
rater acceptance of MSFS than under conditions of higher control.
H5: Control will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater perceptions of the benefits of
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multisource feedback, such that under conditions of lower control,
increases in perceptions of organizational politics will be associated
with lower rater perceptions of the benefits of multisource feedback
than under conditions of higher control.
H6: Control will moderate the relationship between perceptions of
organizational politics and rater perceptions of the costs of
multisource feedback, such that under conditions of lower control,
increases in perceptions of organizational politics will be associated
with higher rater perceptions of the costs of multisource feedback
than under conditions of higher control.
Understanding and Control. Although understanding and control are distinct
constructs, there may be some overlap in their influence on how individuals interpret
organizational politics (Ferris et al., 1989). Individuals who understand organizational
politics processes and outcomes should be able to position themselves to exercise
control over political events. Conversely, it would be difficult to exert control over
organization processes without some level of understanding of organizational events.
Thus, individuals who feel that they have both understanding and control would likely
have the most positive attitudes toward MSFS because they would be in the best
position to take advantage of potential opportunities and avoid potential negative
outcomes. In these situations, positive attitudes likely result. However, individuals
who have both low understanding and control (as opposed to individuals who feel they
have some understanding or control) may be most likely to focus on the potential threats
posed by MSFS rather than on the potential advantages of such systems to both
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themselves and their organizations. These situations likely result in lower rater
attitudes. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
H7: Understanding and control will moderate (i.e., a three-way
interaction) the relationship between perceptions of organizational
politics and rater acceptance of MSFS, such
that individuals with high levels of both understanding and control
will demonstrate the most positive relationship between perceptions
of organizational politics and rater acceptance of multisource
feedback systems, while individuals with the low levels of both
understanding and control will demonstrate the most negative
relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater
acceptance of MSFS.
H8: Understanding and control will moderate (i.e., a three-way
interaction) the relationship between perceptions of organizational
politics and rater perceptions of the benefits of multisource
feedback systems, such that individuals with high levels of both
understanding and control will demonstrate the most positive
relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater
perceptions of the benefits of MSFS, while individuals with low
levels of both understanding and control will demonstrate the most
negative relationship between perceptions of organizational politics
and rater perceptions of the benefits of MSFS.
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H9: Understanding and control will moderate (i.e., a three-way
interaction) the relationship between perceptions of organizational
politics and rater perceptions of the costs of multisource feedback
systems, such that individuals with high levels of both
understanding and control will demonstrate the most negative
relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater
perceptions of the costs of MSFS, while individuals with low levels
of both understanding and control will demonstrate the most
positive relationship between perceptions of organizational politics
and rater perceptions of the costs of MSFS.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants in this study were 603 full-time working adults. Three samples
were used in this research. The first sample consisted of 147 participants and assessed
rater attitudes concerning evaluating one’s subordinates (i.e., supervisor feedback
sample). The majority of participants in the first sample were male (62%) and worked
in middle-level managerial positions (50%), as opposed to upper-level (29%) and
lower-level (21%) managerial positions. The mean age of participants in this sample
was 39.68 (SD = 9.85) and they had been in their current position for an average of 6.10
years (SD = 6.42). One-hundred-and-twenty-nine participants (88%) reported having
experience giving feedback to their subordinates, 76 participants (52%) reported having
experience giving peer feedback, and 59 participants (40%) reported experience with
providing feedback to their supervisors. Participants were employed in a wide variety
of organizational settings including the service industry (37%), manufacturing (15%),
and government (14%). On average, participants’ organizations employed 7,237.11
individuals (SD = 40,693.24).
The second sample included 202 participants and assessed rater attitudes about
evaluating one’s peers (i.e., peer feedback sample). The majority of participants in this
sample were male (52%) and worked in non-managerial positions (50%), as opposed to
upper-level (11%), middle-level (27%), and lower-level (12%) managerial positions.
On average, participants had held their current position for 6.55 years (SD = 7.24) and
were 39.49 years of age (SD = 11.44). Seventy-six participants (37%) reported prior
experience providing peer feedback, while 87 participants (43%) reported prior
experience giving feedback to their subordinates and 67 participants (33%) reported
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prior experience with providing feedback for their supervisors. The mean number of
individuals employed by participants’ organizations was 10,982.29 (SD = 63,522.64).
The most common organizational settings reported by participants were the service
industry (24%), government (17%), and manufacturing (14%).
Finally, the third sample (n = 253) assessed rater attitudes concerning evaluating
one’s supervisor (i.e., subordinate feedback sample). The majority of participants in the
third sample were female (53%) and worked in non-managerial positions (43%), as
opposed to upper-level (15%), middle-level (29%), and lower-level (11%) managerial
positions. The mean age of participants was 41.00 (SD = 10.62) and the average tenure
in their current position was 7.52 years (SD = 6.77). Eighty-five participants (34%)
reported having previously provided feedback for their supervisors, while 139
participants (55%) reported previous experience providing feedback to subordinates and
90 (36%) reported previous experience providing peer feedback. The most common
organizational settings for this sample were the service industry (32%), government
(14%), and manufacturing (13%). The mean number of individuals employed by
participants’ organizations was 8,256.21 (SD = 51,039).
Measures
Scale items and response options for each measure are located in Appendix A.
Each scale is described below.
Perceived Organizational Politics. Perceptions of organizational politics were
measured using Ferris and Kacmar’s (1992) 31-item Perceptions of Organizational
Politics Scale (POPS). The POPS is designed to measure respondents’ perceptions
regarding the level of political behavior in their organizations. The scale includes items
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such as “The rules and policies concerning promotion and pay are fair; it is how
supervisors carry out the policies that is unfair and self-serving” and “I have seen
people deliberately distort information requested by others for purposes of personal
gain, either by withholding it or by selectively reporting it.”
Understanding. Understanding of organizational events was measured using
Tetrick and LaRocco’s (1987) three-item Understanding of Events Scale (UES) and
three items written for the current research. The UES assesses the extent to which
respondents understand the events within their work environment. Sample items from
this scale include “To what extent do you know why others at work act the way they
do?” and “To what extent do you understand the reasons why job-related decisions were
made?” Because of the marginal reliability estimates reported for this scale (Ferris et
al., 1996a, α =.75; Tetrick & LaRocco, α = .75), three additional items were written and
added to this scale. The additional items are “To what extent do you understand how
your organization works?,” “To what extent do you understand why most things
happen in your organization?,” and “To what extent do you know what information
your employer uses when making decisions?”
Control. Control over organizational processes was measured using Tetrick and
LaRocco’s (1987) six-item Control Over One’s Work Environment Scale. This scale
was designed to measure the level of control respondents feel that they have over their
work environment. Sample items from this scale include “To what extent do you have
influence over the things that affect you on the job?” and “To what extent do you have
the opportunity to take part in making job-related decisions that affect you?”
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Rater Acceptance of MSFS. Rater acceptance of MSFS was measured using
nine items developed specifically for this study. Three scales with parallel wording and
structure were created to assess rater acceptance of the use of supervisor, peer, and
subordinate feedback. Sample items include “(Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback
is an acceptable way to evaluate (subordinate/coworker/supervisor) performance” and
“I would prefer not to have to provide performance ratings for my
(subordinates/coworkers/supervisor)” (reverse scored).
Rater Perceptions of the Benefits of MSFS. Rater perceptions of the benefits of
MSFS were assessed by Bettenhausen and Fedor’s (1997) seven-item Positive
Appraisal Outcomes Scale (PAOS). This scale was designed to measure the extent to
which users perceive that positive outcomes will result from the use of multisource
feedback. Bettenhausen and Fedor created two parallel versions of this scale: one
targeting peer feedback and the other targeting subordinate feedback. An additional
version of the scale was developed for this research designed to assess rater perceptions
of supervisor feedback (i.e., by replacing the words “peer” with “supervisor” and
“coworkers” with “subordinates”). Thus, parallel scales targeting each rater source
were utilized in the current research. Sample items include “(Supervisor/Peer/
Subordinate) feedback would provide quality feedback to recipients” and
“(Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would add an important dimension to the
performance appraisal system.”
Rater Perceptions of the Costs of MSFS. Rater perceptions of the costs of
MSFS were assessed by Bettenhausen and Fedor’s (1997) 10-item Negative Appraisal
Outcomes Scale (NAOS). This scale was designed to measure the extent to which
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participants’ agreed that negative outcomes would result from the use of multisource
feedback. As above, this scale will be used to assess rater perceptions regarding the
costs of providing feedback from each rater source’s perspective. Examples of items
from this scale include “(Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would jeopardize
working relationships” and “(Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would make
employees feel vulnerable to retribution.”
Additional Measures. Demographic information (e.g., gender, age,
organizational type, tenure, education, managerial level) and respondent prior
experience with MSFS (i.e., “Have you ever been asked to evaluate the performance of
a supervisor?”, “Have you ever been asked to evaluate the performance of a peer”, and
“Have you ever been asked to evaluate the performance of a subordinate?”) also were
collected. Gender was coded as 0 = “Female” and 1 = “Male.” Prior Experience was
coded as 0 = “no prior experience” and 1 = “prior experience”. Further, because it was
a categorical variable, managerial position was dummy coded such that three additional
variables were created: upper-level manager, middle-level manager, and lower-level
manager.
Pilot Test of Measures. Because several items were developed specifically for
this study, a pilot study was conducted to assess the reliability of the scales used in the
current research. In this study, a questionnaire containing each of the proposed scales
was given to 67 undergraduate psychology students. Results indicated that every scale
evidenced acceptable levels of estimated reliability (range: α = .83 to α = .92).
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Procedure
Undergraduate students were offered extra credit to help identify potential
participants. Students were trained (e.g., informed of research purpose, informed of
procedure) and asked to distribute questionnaire packets to full-time working adults.
Each packet included a letter to the student, a letter to the participant, a questionnaire,
and a postage-paid return envelope. The student letter (see Appendix B) (a) thanked the
student for participating, (b) described the target participant population (see below), and
(c) described the disbursement procedure. The participant letter (see Appendix C)
informed participants of the purpose of the current research and their rights as subjects.
This letter also notified participants that their responses would be confidential and that
completion of the survey constituted informed consent. Finally, instructions for
completing and returning the questionnaire were provided.
Three versions of the questionnaire were developed. Each questionnaire
included measures assessing participant demographics, perceptions of organizational
politics (POPS), understanding, and control. Questionnaires differed, however, in the
rater source to which rater attitudes were directed. Specifically, one questionnaire
assessed rater attitudes toward supervisor feedback, another assessed rater attitudes
toward peer feedback, and a final questionnaire assessed rater attitudes toward
subordinate feedback. Students were instructed to distribute questionnaires assessing
rater attitudes toward supervisor feedback to individuals who currently hold managerial
positions. However, students were allowed to distribute questionnaires assessing
attitudes toward peer and subordinate feedback to any full-time working adult. So that
participants would be representative of individuals who work for organizations in which
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a MSFS might realistically be implemented, students (for all three questionnaire types)
were instructed to avoid distributing questionnaires to other students, individuals who
work for colleges or universities, individuals who work for organizations with less than
two managerial levels, and individuals who work for family businesses. Finally,
students were told that the researchers would contact some questionnaire respondents to
ensure that respondents completed the surveys.
The questionnaires began by giving instructions concerning the items assessing
their attitudes toward MSFS (see Appendix D). These instructions defined MSFS and
asked participants to imagine that their current organization was going to implement a
MSFS for developmental purposes. Participants were then informed of the perspective
(i.e., supervisor, peer, subordinate) that they should take when responding to this part of
the questionnaire. These instructions were followed by the items measuring rater
acceptance of MSFS, rater perceptions of the benefits of MSFS, and rater perceptions of
the costs of MSFS. Next, participants were asked to think about their current
organization when responding to items assessing understanding, control, and their
perceptions of organizational politics. Finally, the questionnaire asked participants to
respond to items assessing their demographic characteristics and their previous
experience with MSFS. Completed questionnaires were returned directly to the
researchers via a self-addressed, postage paid envelope.
Four-hundred-and-thirty supervisor feedback packets, 500 peer feedback
packets, and 500 subordinate feedback packets were distributed. One-hundred-andsixty-one supervisor feedback questionnaires (37% response rate), 219 peer feedback
questionnaires (44% response rate), and 279 subordinate feedback questionnaires (56%
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response rate) were completed and returned. For reasons discussed above, participants
were eliminated from this research if they were students (n = 6), worked for an
organization with less than two managerial levels (n = 16), worked for a family business
(n = 21), or worked part-time (n = 18). Additionally, three individuals were eliminated
from the supervisor feedback sample because they were not supervisors. As such, the
usable sample size was 603 participants. Finally, 34 participants (6% of total sample)
were contacted to ensure that they responded to the questionnaire themselves. In every
instance, participants indicated that they did in fact complete the questionnaires.
Data Analysis
Data analysis for this research was conducted in three stages. First,
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted to assess the factor structure of all
scales for each version of the questionnaire. After the appropriate model was identified,
items were collapsed into scales. Second, descriptive statistics and scale
intercorrelations were calculated and reported. Finally, hierarchical moderated
regression analyses were conducted to test the hypothesized relationships. Post-hoc
analyses were conducted when appropriate (i.e., observed significant interactions).
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RESULTS
Measurement Model
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were utilized to identify the appropriate
measurement model for the current research. All model tests were conducted using the
following steps. First, in order to better approximate the linear factor model assumption
of multivariate normality, items for each scale were randomly combined into testlets
(i.e., subscales consisting of two to three items) (see Appendix E). The use of testlets
(as opposed to using individual items as indicators) results in more parsimonious
solutions, more normally distributed indicators, less unique indicator variance, and
more reliable indicators (Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). Second, the models were estimated
using LISREL 8.51 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2001). In these analyses, maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation was applied to the testlet covariance matrices. Finally, fit
indices were used to identify the model that provided the best fit for the current data.
A wide variety of fit indices are available for assessing whether a model “fits”
research data. One of the most traditional fit indices is the χ2 test statistic, which tests
whether the population covariance matrix is significantly different from the covariance
matrix implied by a model. Unfortunately, this test is somewhat problematic. In
addition to the fact that it requires the researcher to accept the null hypothesis, it is very
difficult to obtain a non-significant result when large sample sizes are utilized
(Kelloway, 1998). Consequently, several other fit indices have been developed to
assess model fit. For example, the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA)
is an analysis of residuals, with smaller values indicating superior fit. Steiger (1990)
indicated that values below .05 represent a very good fit to the data. For several other
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common fit indices (e.g., GFI, AGFI, NFI, CFI), however, higher values represent
better fit. These indices range from 0 to 1, with values over .90 suggesting good fit
(Kelloway, 1998). Finally, the χ2 difference test can be used to directly compare
competing models. A significant finding using this test indicates that the model with
the lower χ2 value fits the data significantly better than the alternative model.
Hypothesized Measurement Model. To determine the appropriate measurement
model for the current research, several potential measurement models were tested. As a
first step, the hypothesized measurement model (see Figure 1) was assessed using CFA.
As displayed in Table 1, the fit indices converge in suggesting that the hypothesized
model provides an excellent fit to the data (χ2(260) = 620.89, p < .05, GFI = .92, AGFI
= .91, RMSEA = .048, NFI = .95, CFI = .97). Thus, this model was used as a baseline
in comparisons with alternative measurement models. In all, seven alternative models
were tested.
Perceived Organizational Politics. Several different factor structures have been
proposed for perceptions of organizational politics (Kacmar & Barron, 1999). For
example, Kacmar and Ferris (1991), using a principal components analysis, found
support for a model that consisted of five factors: general political behavior, go along to
get ahead, coworkers, supervisor, and pay and promotion policies. In the same
research, a second model emerged after several items were eliminated because they also
loaded on the Job Descriptive Index (JDI). This abbreviated three-factor model
contained the following factors: general political behavior, go along to get ahead, and
pay and promotion policies. Nye and Witt (1993), however, analyzed the POPS using
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Model.
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Table 1
Summary of Confirmatory Factor Analyses for POPS
Model
Hypothesized Model
Alternative Model 1
Alternative Model 2
Alternative Model 3
Alternative Model 4
Alternative Model 5
Alternative Model 6
Alternative Model 7

χ2(df)
620.89 (260)*
774.89 (272)*
607.54 (256)*
649.30(265)*
604.10(246)*
738.98(265)*
573.78(242)*
5,410.73(252)*

RMSEA

GFI

AGFI

NFI

CFI

.05
.09
.05
.05
.05
.06
.05
.26

.92
.91
.93
.92
.93
.91
.93
.40

.91
.88
.90
.90
.91
.89
.91
.29

.95
.93
.95
.94
.95
.94
.95
.52

.97
.95
.97
.97
.97
.96
.97
.53

Note: * p < .05
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both principal components analysis and confirmatory factor analysis and found that a
unidimensional (i.e., one-factor) model best fit their data.
To determine the appropriate factor structure for participants’organizational
politics perceptions in the current research, two alternative models were tested. As
Figure 1 displays, the hypothesized model was a unidimensional model in which each
item loaded onto one global factor (c.f., Nye & Witt, 1993). The first alternative model
was based on Kacmar and Ferris’s (1991) 3-dimensional model (see Figure 2). Because
the pay and promotion policies dimension only contained two items, only one testlet
was formed for this factor. Consistent with recent research (e.g., Chen, Gully,
Whiteman, & Kilchullen, 2000), the factor loading for this testlet onto its latent variable
was set equal to the square root of the testlet’s reliability coefficient. Further, the error
variance of the parameter was set equal to 1 minus the reliability of the testlet,
multiplied by the variance [(1-rxy)*SD2]. The second alternative model assessed was
Kacmar and Ferris’s (1991) expanded 5-factor conceptualization (see Figure 3). Again,
because the coworkers (three items) and pay and promotion policies (two items)
dimensions contained only a limited number of items, only one testlet was created for
these dimensions.
Fit indices for the alternative models are displayed in Table 1. The chi-square
difference test indicates that the hypothesized model provides a better fit to the data
than does the three-factor model (∆χ2 (12) = 154.00, p < .05). However, the
hypothesized model and the five-factor model were not statistically different in their fit
to the data (∆χ2 (4) = 13.35, p > .05). Because neither of these alternative measurement
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Figure 2: Alternative Model 1.
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Figure 3: Alternative Model 2.
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models fit the data in the current research significantly better than the hypothesized
model, the hypothesized model was retained.
Understanding and Control. Confirmatory factor analyses also were conducted
to examine whether participants made a distinction between understanding of
organizational events and control over organizational processes. Under the
hypothesized model, the understanding and control items loaded onto separate
constructs (see Figure 1). This model assumes that participants were able to make
distinctions between how much understanding and control they had within their
organization. In the third alternative model (see Figure 4), the understanding and
control items loaded onto a single factor. This model assumes that participants did not
distinguish between their understanding and control within their organization. Under
this model, an individual’s understanding and control would both be perceived as
indicators of the same construct (e.g., one’s power within an organization). The
goodness-of-fit indices (see Table 1) indicated that the hypothesized model provided a
superior fit to the data over the third alternative model (∆χ2(5) = 28.41, p < .05). Thus,
the hypothesized model was retained.
Rater Attitudes toward MSFS. Three CFAs were conducted to assess participant
responses to the three scales that measured rater attitudes toward MSFS. The
hypothesized model (see Figure 1) suggests that participants were able to distinguish
between items from the three rater attitude scales measuring their perceived benefits,
costs, and acceptance of MSFS. In the fourth alternative model, all of the items for
these scales loaded onto one factor (see Figure 5). This model proposes that
participants simply came to one overall evaluation of MSFS and did not distinguish
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Figure 4: Alternative Model 3.
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Figure 5: Alternative Model 4.

36

between the three measures. Because this model assumes that the NAOS items simply
represent the opposite pole of the acceptance and PAOS items, the NAOS items were
reverse scored for this analysis. In the fifth alternative model (see Figure 6), the items
from the acceptance scale and the PAOS loaded onto one factor, while the items from
the NAOS loaded on a separate factor. Under this model, participants would not be
able to distinguish between the acceptance and PAOS items and would simply form
attitudes toward the positive and negative aspects of MSFS. The sixth alternative model
(see Figure 7) proposed that the items from the acceptance scale load onto one factor,
while the items from the PAOS and the NAOS load onto a second factor. This model
assumes that while participants would be able to develop an independent evaluation of
their acceptance of MSFS, they would not be able to formulate separate attitudes toward
the benefits and costs of MSFS (i.e., they would form a single cost-benefit attitude
toward MSFS in which benefits were on one pole and costs were on the other pole).
Again, because this model assumes that the PAOS and NAOS represent opposite poles
of the same latent construct, the NAOS items were reverse scored for this analysis.
As presented in Table 1, the goodness-of-fit indices indicate that while the
hypothesized model provides a better fit to the data than the fifth alternative model (i.e.,
the model in which the acceptance and PAOS items loaded onto the same factor)
(∆χ2(5) = 118.09, p < .05), it did not provide a significantly better fit than the other two
alternative models. Further, the sixth alternative model (i.e. the model in which the
PAOS and NAOS items loaded onto the same factor) provided a significantly better fit
than the hypothesized model (∆χ2(18) = 47.11, p < .05) as well as all of the other
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Figure 6: Alternative Model 5.
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Figure 7: Alternative Model 6.

39

alternative models (see Table 1). Thus, the hypothesized model was rejected and the
sixth alternative model was utilized in the current research.
Common Method Variance. To test whether the results were due to common
method variance, the accepted measurement model (see Figure 7) was compared to a
seventh alternative model in which each of the testlets loaded onto a single factor (see
Figure 8). This model is consistent with the concept of common method variance. As
Table 1 demonstrates, the fit indices converge in suggesting that the accepted
measurement model provides a superior fit to the current data (∆χ2(10) = 4,836.95, p <
.05).
Development of Scales
Based on the results of the CFAs, scales for each of the variables in the
measurement model were created. Scale means, standard deviations, reliability
estimates, and intercorrelations for the supervisor feedback sample, the peer feedback
sample, the subordinate feedback sample, and the combined sample are presented in
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. It should be noted that the mean of POPS was
slightly below the midpoint for all three samples. This is consistent with past research
on organizational politics perceptions (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris, Harrell-Cook, &
Dulebohn, 2000; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). Conversely, rater acceptance and rater costbenefit evaluations were above the midpoint for all samples, indicating that participants
generally had positive attitudes toward MSFS. These results are consistent with
Bettenhausen and Fedor’s (1997) findings concerning user attitudes toward alternative
feedback sources. Each of the scales in the present research demonstrated acceptable
reliability (range: α = .82 to α = .96).
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Figure 8: Alternative Model 7.
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Mean
2.55
3.90
3.89
4.28
3.89
6.10
0.90
39.68
0.62

St. Dev
0.54
0.64
0.77
0.46
0.46
6.42
0.31
9.85
0.49

1
(.91)
-.36*
-.24*
-.14
-.28*
.03
.02
-.04
.08
(.82)
.55*
.21*
.17*
.12
.06
-.07
.17*

2

(.85)
.06
.13
.08
-.05
.07
.03

3

Note: * p < .05. Coefficient alpha reliability estimates are reported on the diagonal.

1. Perceptions of Organizational Politics
2. Understanding
3. Control
4. Acceptance
5. Cost-Benefit Evaluations
6. Tenure
7. Prior Experience
8. Age
9. Gender

N
147
147
147
147
147
140
144
146
147
(.85)
.59*
.09
.08
.13
.05

4

(.87)
.20*
.03
.11
.09

5

--.08
.38*
-.05

6

--.17*
.01

7

--.03

8

Table 2
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and Intercorrelations in the Supervisor Feedback Sample

---

9
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Mean
2.88
3.58
3.37
3.26
3.04
6.55
0.40
39.49
0.52

St. Dev
0.62
0.76
0.99
0.99
0.83
7.24
0.49
11.44
0.50

1
(.92)
-.36*
-.38*
-.23*
-.34*
.07
-.09
.05
.00
(.86)
.47*
.11
.17*
-.17*
.12
-.05
-.09

2

(.88)
.15*
.13
-.08
.18*
.02
.05

3

Note: * p < .05. Coefficient alpha reliability estimates are reported on the diagonal.

1. Perceptions of Organizational Politics
2. Understanding
3. Control
4. Acceptance
5. Cost-Benefit Evaluations
6. Tenure
7. Prior Experience
8. Age
9. Gender

N
202
202
202
202
202
191
192
200
202
(.96)
.86*
-.13
.21*
-.17*
.12

4

(.95)
-.10
.19*
-.11
.06

5

--.09
.43*
.06

6

--.06
.13

7

Table 3
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and Intercorrelations in the Peer Feedback Sample

--.03

8

---

9

44

Mean
2.74
3.61
3.52
3.81
3.43
7.52
0.34
41.00
0.47

St. Dev
0.56
0.73
0.98
0.77
0.66
6.77
0.48
10.62
0.50

1
(.90)
-.21*
-.34*
-.12
-.20*
.09
-.14*
-.12
.01
(.83)
.49*
-.03
.07
-.05
.14*
.06
.07

2

(.89)
-.01
.06
-.04
.22*
.16*
.11

3

Note: * p < .05. Coefficient alpha reliability estimates are reported on the diagonal.

1. Perceptions of Organizational Politics
2. Understanding
3. Control
4. Acceptance
5. Cost-Benefit Evaluations
6. Tenure
7. Prior Experience
8. Age
9. Gender

N
253
253
253
253
253
226
247
252
253
(.90)
.73*
-.03
.13*
-.03
.15*

4

(.92)
-.04
.17*
.02
.08*

5

--.23*
.37*
.10

6

--.10
.13*

7

--.13*

8

Table 4
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and Intercorrelations in the Subordinate Feedback Sample

---

9

45

N
602
602
602
602
602
557
577
574
578
598
602

Mean
2.74
3.67
3.56
3.74
3.41
6.83
0.62
0.42
0.37
40.17
0.52

St. Dev
0.59
0.73
0.96
0.88
0.75
6.86
0.49
0.49
0.48
10.73
0.50

1
(.91)
-.32*
-.36*
-.24*
-.33*
.08
-.11*
-.09*
-.12*
-.04
.01
(.84)
.51*
.12*
.18*
-.07
.16*
.18*
.25*
-.01
.05

2

(.88)
.15*
.17*
-.04
.15*
.16*
.29*
.08*
.09*

3

(.94)
.82*
-.06
.17*
.16*
.15*
-.06
.13*

4

Note: * p < .05. Coefficient alpha reliability estimates are reported on the diagonal.

1. Perceptions of Organizational Politics
2. Understanding
3. Control
4. Acceptance
5. Cost-Benefit Evaluations
6. Tenure
7. Prior Experience-Subordinate Ratings
8. Prior Experience-Peer Ratings
9. Prior Experience-Supervisor Ratings
10. Age
11. Gender
(.94)
-.04
.20*
.18*
.15*
-.02
.09*

5

--.18*
.12*
.03
.40*
.04

6

--.54*
.29*
.08*
.10*

7

--.41*
.06
.06

8

Table 5
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and Intercorrelations in the Combined Sample

--.17*
.19*

9

--.07

10

---

11

For all three samples, POPS was negatively related to understanding and
control. Thus, individuals with higher levels of understanding (control) within their
organization perceived lower levels of organizational politics than individuals who
reported lower levels of understanding (control). Past research investigating these
variables found similar correlations (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris et al., 1994;
Kacmar et al., 1999). POPS also demonstrated a significant negative correlation with
rater cost-benefit evaluations in all three samples. This finding indicates that
participants who reported higher organizational politics perceptions expected less
positive rater experiences than individuals who reported lower perceptions of
organizational politics. Interestingly, although POPS was negatively related to rater
cost-benefit evaluations for all three samples, it was only significantly related to rater
acceptance in the peer feedback sample. The negative bivariate correlation between
POPS and rater acceptance of peer feedback suggests that individuals who perceive
high levels of politics within their organization are less accepting of the opportunity to
provide peer feedback than individuals who report lower levels of organizational
politics. It should also be noted that while organizational tenure (Ferris et al., 1994) and
tenure with supervisor (Gilmore et al., 1996) were used as proxies of understanding in
previous research, job tenure was unrelated to understanding in the supervisor and
subordinate feedback samples and was negatively related to understanding in the peer
sample.
Regression Analyses
The hypotheses for the current research were tested using hierarchical
moderated regression analyses. Four regression analyses were conducted for each

46

hypothesis. The first three analyses examined the degree of variance explained by the
predictor variables (and their interactions) in the supervisor ratings sample, the peer
ratings sample, and the subordinate ratings sample, respectively. Because there were
significant correlations between various demographic factors and the rater attitude
variables, some of the demographic variables were included in the regression analyses
as control variables (i.e., managerial level, prior experience with the specific type of
feedback, gender). As such, the control variables were entered in the first step, the main
effect terms were entered in the second step (e.g., POPS, understanding, control), the
appropriate two-way interaction terms were entered in the third step, and the three-way
interaction term (when applicable) was entered in the fourth step. Because centering
predictor variables reduces the multicollinearity that can be introduced into regression
equations when interaction terms are used (Aiken & West, 1991; Marquardt, 1980), the
predictor variables (i.e., organizational politics perceptions, understanding, control)
were centered for all analyses.
To provide a more omnibus test across raters, a fourth regression analysis was
conducted in the combined sample to test each hypothesis. For these analyses, several
control variables (i.e., rater source, managerial level, prior experience with the specific
type of feedback source, gender) were entered in the first step, the main effect terms
were entered in the second step, the two-way interaction terms were entered in the third
step, and the three-way interaction term (when applicable) was entered in the fourth
step.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis predicted that understanding would interact
with organizational politics perceptions to predict rater acceptance of MSFS. Table 6
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presents the results of the regression analyses testing this hypothesis in the independent
samples. The results suggest that the interaction between organizational politics
perceptions and understanding failed to account for significant incremental variance in
each of the independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 136) =
0.02, p =.968; peer ratings sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 183) = 2.27, p = .134; subordinate
ratings sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 236) = 0.77, p = .38). However, as displayed in Table
7, the two-way interaction term did account for significant variance in rater acceptance
of MSFS for the combined sample (∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 541) = 8.44, p < .05).
To explore this significant interaction, guidelines suggested by Cohen and
Cohen (1983) were utilized. Rater acceptance of MSFS (see Figure 9) was regressed on
POPS at three levels of understanding: the mean of the understanding variable, one
standard deviation above the mean of the understanding variable, and one standard
deviation below the mean of the control variable. The reference lines in Figure 9
represent POPS at the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one standard
deviation above the mean. As hypothesized, when understanding is low, POPS is
associated with lower acceptance of MSFS than when understanding is high. Thus, the
current research found partial support for Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 and 3. Because the CFAs suggested that the respondents in the
current research did not distinguish between the items on the PAOS and the NAOS, the
second and third hypotheses were combined. These hypotheses suggested that
understanding would interact with organizational politics perceptions in the prediction
of rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS. As shown in Table 8, the understanding x
organizational politics perceptions interaction failed to account for significant variance
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Table 6
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Understanding on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Acceptance of
MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Understanding
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.02
-.09

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

.12
.04
.02
0.73

.07
-.04
-.12
.35*
.20
.06
2.17

-.23
-.03
-.08
.19
.26*
.04
1.97

-.05
.13
.06
.04
3.00

-.34*
.00
.10
.04
4.36*

-.22*
-.05
.06
.02
2.74

.01
.06
.00
0.01

.22
.11
.01
2.31

.10
.06
.00
0.64

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 7
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Understanding on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Acceptance of
MSFS in Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.45*
-.53*
-.11
-.03
-.08
-.09
.15
.20*
.21*
.23
17.92*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.23*
-.02
.25
.02
6.96*

Step 3
Politics x Understanding
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.15*
.26
.01
4.44*

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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4.2
4.1
4.0

Acceptance of MSFS

3.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.4

Understanding

3.3

Low Understanding

3.2

Medium Understanding

3.1

High Understanding

3.0

Perceptions of Organizational Politics
Reference lines represent the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 9: POPS x Understanding Interaction on Rater Acceptance of MSFS in
Combined Sample.
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Table 8
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Understanding on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Understanding
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.09
-.02

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

-.07
-.19
-.16
.27*
.08
.05
1.90

-.21
-.13
-.04
.20*
.13
.03
1.63

-.23*
.07
.10
.09
6.52*

-.40*
.07
.16
.11
11.56*

-.24*
.05
.08
.04
5.24*

-.06
.10
.00
0.59

.14
.16
.01
1.48

.05
.08
.00
0.26

.01
.10
.01
0.41

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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in rater cost-benefit evaluations in any of the independent samples (supervisor ratings
sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.59, p = .44; peer ratings sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1,
181) = 1.48, p = .23; subordinate ratings sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.26, p = .61).
Similarly, as presented in Table 9, the two-way interaction did not significantly predict
rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS in the combined sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 531)
= 2.54, p = .11). Consequently, the results did not provide support for the proposition
that understanding moderates the relationship between organizational politics
perceptions and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS.
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis asserted that control moderates the
relationship between organizational politics perceptions and rater acceptance of MSFS.
However, as demonstrated in Table 10, the results indicate that the control x
organizational politics perceptions interaction did not account for significant variance in
rater acceptance in any of the independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, ∆R2 =
.01, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.70, p = .40; peer ratings sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 181) = 2.35, p =
.13; subordinate ratings sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.76, p = .39). Similarly, as
shown in Table 11, control failed to significantly interact with organizational politics
perceptions in the combined sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 531) = 2.15, p = .14). Thus, the
fourth hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 5 and 6. The fifth and sixth hypotheses suggest that control
moderates the relationship between organizational politics perceptions and rater costbenefit evaluations of MSFS. As shown in Table 12, the control x organizational
politics perceptions interaction failed to account for significant variance in cost-benefit
evaluations for the supervisor ratings sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.04, p = .84),
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Table 9
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Understanding on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS in Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.43*
-.37*
-.21*
-.13
-.11
-.07
.13
.21*
.12
.22
17.09*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.30*
.05
.28
.05
20.05*

Step 3
Politics x Understanding
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.10
.28
.00
2.54

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 10
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Acceptance of
MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
.03
-.07

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

.15
.06
.02
0.73

.07
-.03
-.12
.34*
.18
.06
2.17

-.23
-.02
-.09
.18
.25
.04
1.97

-.10
.02
.04
.02
1.06

-.32*
.01
.10
.04
4.26*

-.24*
-.06
.07
.03
3.32*

.08
.04
.01
0.70

.17
.11
.01
2.35

-.08
.07
.00
0.76

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 11
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Acceptance of
MSFS in Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.43*
-.55*
-.10
-.01
-.06
-.11
.16
.20*
.20*
.23
17.92*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.23*
-.02
.25
.02
6.97*

Step 3
Politics x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.09
.26
.00
2.15

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 12
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.10
-.02

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

-.03
-.11
-.13
.28*
.06
.05
1.90

-.22
-.14
-.06
.17
.11
.03
1.63

-.23*
.05
.10
.09
6.70*

-.44*
-.02
.15
.10
10.69*

-.24*
.02
.07
.04
4.89*

-.02
.10
.00
0.04

.08
.15
.00
0.81

-.14
.08
.01
3.16

.04
.11
.01
0.41

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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the peer ratings sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 181) = 0.81, p = .37), and the subordinate
ratings sample (∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 234) = 3.16, p = .08). Likewise, as displayed in Table
13, the control x organizational politics perceptions interaction failed to significantly
predict cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS in the combined sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1,
531) = 0.03, p = .87). Consequently, the current research did not support the
hypothesized interaction.
Hypothesis 7. The seventh hypothesis posited a three-way interaction in which
understanding and control moderate the organizational politics perceptions-rater
acceptance of MSFS relationship. As presented in Table 14, the three-way interaction
did not explain unique variance in any of the independent samples (supervisor feedback
sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 131) = 1.90, p = .17; peer feedback sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1,
177) = 0.01, p = .92); subordinate feedback sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 230) = 1.58, p =
.21). Similarly, as shown in Table 15, the three-way interaction failed to account for
significant variance in the combined sample (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 527) = 0.89, p = .35).
Hypotheses 8 and 9. The eighth and ninth hypotheses suggested a three-way
interaction in which understanding and control moderate the relationship between
organizational politics perceptions and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS. The
results of the analyses testing this proposition are presented in Tables 16 and 17. The
hypothesized three-way interaction failed to significantly predict rater cost-benefit
evaluations of MSFS in any of the current independent samples (see Table 16)
(supervisor feedback sample, ∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 131) = 1.25, p = .27; peer feedback
sample, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 177) = 0.39, p = .53; subordinate feedback sample, ∆R2 = .00,
∆F(1, 230) = 0.49, p = .49). Likewise, the three-way interaction was not significant in
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Table 13
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Organizational Politics Perceptions and Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS in Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.43*
-.38*
-.19
-.11
-.09
-.09
.14
.21*
.11
.22
17.09*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.31*
.01
.28
.05
18.98*

Step 3
Politics x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.01
.28
.00
0.03

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 14
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating 3-Way Interaction on Rater Acceptance of
MSFS
Independent Variable

Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi
Step 4
Politics x Understanding x Control
R2j
∆R2k
∆Fl

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback Sample

.09
.04
.02
0.73

.14
.01
-.09
.37*
.18
.06
2.17

-.18
-.01
-.11
.19
.25*
.04
1.97

-.12
.19*
-.02
.07
.05
2.15

-.27*
-.05
.01
.10
.04
2.90*

-.20
-.08
-.04
.07
.03
2.21

.01
.13
.04
.07
.01
0.35

.01
.06
-.26*
.15
.05
3.37*

.18
-.18
-.05
.08
.02
1.39

.16
.09
.01
1.90

.01
.15
.00
0.01

-.14
.09
.01
1.58

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
.00
-.06

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
j 2
R at Step 4. k Change in R2 from Step 3 to Step 4. l Change in F value from Step 3 to
Step 4.* p < .05
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Table 15
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating 3-Way Interaction on Rater Acceptance of
MSFS in Combined Sample.
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.45*
-.53*
-.08
-.02
-.08
-.09
.16
.21*
.20*
.22
17.92*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.20*
-.04
-.03
.25
.02
4.64*

Step 3
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.07
.00
-.10
.27
.01
3.10*

Step 4
Politics x Understanding x Control
R2j
∆R2k
∆Fl

-.06
.27
.00
0.89

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3. j
R2 at Step 4. k Change in R2 from Step 3 to Step 4.
l
Change in F value from Step 3 to Step 4. * p < .05
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Table 16
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating 3-Way Interaction on Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS.
Independent Variable

Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi
Step 4
Politics x Understanding x Control
R2j
∆R2k
∆Fl

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback Sample

.01
.11
.01
0.41

.00
-.08
-.12
.31*
.07
.05
1.90

-.20
-.14
-.09
.18
.12
.03
1.63

-.28*
.07
.06
.10
.09
4.49*

-.32*
.02
-.06
.16
.11
7.83*

-.23*
.00
.02
.08
.04
3.52*

-.03
.06
.03
.11
.01
0.33

-.06
-.05
-.31*
.24
.08
6.32*

.17
-.22*
-.05
.10
.03
2.18

.13
.12
.01
1.25

-.06
.24
.00
0.39

-.07
.10
.00
0.49

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.11
-.02

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
j 2
R at Step 4. k Change in R2 from Step 3 to Step 4. l Change in F value from Step 3 to
Step 4.* p < .05
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Table 17
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating 3-Way Interaction on Rater Cost-Benefit
Evaluations of MSFS in Combined Sample.
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.44*
-.37*
-.19
-.12
-.12
-.07
.13
.22*
.11
.22
17.09*

Step 2
Perceived Organizational Politics
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.26*
.01
-.02
.28
.05
13.35*

Step 3
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

.04
-.08
-.13*
.30
.02
5.22*

Step 4
Politics x Understanding x Control
R2j
∆R2k
∆Fl

-.09
.30
.00
2.59

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3. j
R2 at Step 4. k Change in R2 from Step 3 to Step 4. l Change in F value from Step 3 to
Step 4. * p < .05
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the combined sample (see Table 17) (∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 527) = 2.59, p = .11).
Accordingly, these hypotheses were not supported.
Additional Analyses
Several additional analyses were conducted to explore the relationships between
the variables in the current study. First, two one-way ANOVAs were conducted to
examine whether rater attitudes differed based on rater source (i.e., supervisor ratings,
peer ratings, subordinate ratings). The results demonstrated that rater source
significantly influenced both rater acceptance (F(2, 599) = 72.04, p < .001, η2 = .19) and
rater cost-benefit evaluations (F(2, 599) = 65.61, p < .001, η2 = .18). Follow-up tests
were conducted to investigate the pairwise differences among the means. Because
Levine’s test of equality of error variances indicated that there were significant
differences in the population variances for both rater acceptance (F(2, 599) = 44.14, p <
.001) and rater cost-benefit evaluations (F(2, 599) = 31.79, p < .001), post-hoc
comparisons were conducted using Dunnette’s C test (which does not assume equal
variances). The results of these tests, as presented in Table 18, demonstrated that rater
attitudes were significantly more favorable for supervisor feedback, followed by
subordinate feedback, followed by peer feedback.
One-way ANOVAs also were conducted to investigate whether rater attitudes
toward MSFS differed based on participants’ prior experience with providing
performance feedback ratings. To determine whether participants had prior experience
with MSFS, participants in each sample were asked to indicate whether they had ever
been asked to evaluate the performance of a supervisor, peer, or subordinate. Results
are presented in Table 19. For the supervisor feedback sample, prior experience with
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Table 18
Differences among Samples on Rater Attitudes.
Rater Source

Rater Attitude

M

SD

Supervisor
Acceptance
Feedback
Peer Feedback Acceptance
Subordinate
Acceptance
Feedback

4.28

0.46

3.26
3.81

0.99
0.77

Supervisor
Cost-Benefit Evaluations
Feedback
Peer Feedback Cost-Benefit Evaluations
Subordinate
Cost-Benefit Evaluations
Feedback

3.89

0.46

3.04
3.43

0.83
0.66

* p < .05

65

Supervisor
Peer
Feedback Feedback

*
*

*

*
*

*

Table 19
The Influence of Prior Experience on Rater Attitudes Concerning MSFS.
Sample
Supervisor

Rater Attitude
Acceptance
Cost-benefit
Evaluation

Peer

Acceptance
Cost-Benefit
Evaluation

Subordinate

Acceptance
Cost-Benefit
Evaluation

Experience N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Yes
No
Yes
No

129
15
129
15

4.30
4.18
3.90
3.86

0.47
0.37
0.46
0.49

Yes
No
Yes
No

76
116
76
116

3.51
3.10
3.24
2.92

0.92
1.00
0.80
0.83

Yes
No
Yes
No

85
162
85
162

3.94
3.74
3.59
3.36

0.73
0.80
0.62
0.68

* p < .05
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F
0.85
0.12
8.31*
7.13*
3.98*
6.92*

rating one’s subordinates did not significantly influence rater acceptance (F(1, 142) =
0.85, p = .36, η2 = .01) or rater cost-benefit evaluations (F(1, 142) = 0.12, p = .73, η2 =
.00) of supervisor feedback. However, prior experience giving peer feedback did
significantly impact rater acceptance of peer feedback (F(1, 190) = 8.31, p = .004, η2 =
.04) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback (F(1, 190) = 7.13, p = .01, η2 =
.04). As Table 19 demonstrates, participants who had previous experience with peer
feedback reported higher levels of acceptance and more positive evaluations of peer
feedback than participants without previous rater experience. Similarly, prior
experience with rating one’s supervisor was significantly related to rater acceptance of
subordinate feedback (F(1, 245) = 3.98, p = .047, η2 = .02) and rater cost-benefit
evaluations of subordinate feedback (F(1, 245) = 6.92, p < .01, η2 = .03). Participants
who had previously been asked to evaluate the performance of their supervisors
reported higher levels of acceptance and more positive evaluations of subordinate
feedback than did those without previous experience. Thus, rater attitudes concerning
the use of non-traditional rater sources (e.g., peer ratings, subordinate ratings) were
more positive for individuals who had previously participated in these systems.

A

one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether managerial level was related to
perceptions of organizational politics. Previous research investigating this relationship
has been mixed. While a positive relationship between organizational politics
perceptions and organizational level has been reported in three studies (Drory, 1993;
Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992, study 2), DuBrin (1988) found a negative
relationship and Parker et al. (1995) reported no relationship. In the current research
(see Table 20), managerial level was significantly related to POPS (F(3, 590) = 9.52, p
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< .001, η2 = .05) in the combined sample. Follow-up tests were conducted to
investigate the pairwise differences between groups. Because Levine’s test of equality
of error variances indicated that the group variances were not significantly different
(F(3, 590) = 0.74, p = .74), the Tukey HSD test was used. As displayed in Table 20,
upper-level managers (n = 104) reported significantly lower POPS (M = 2.49, SD =
0.56) than did middle-level managers (n = 200, M = 2.74, SD = 0.59), lower-level
managers (n = 84, M = 2.82, SD = 0.56), and non-managers (n = 206, M = 2.84, SD =
0.57). Thus, on average, participants below upper-management perceived similar
amounts of politics in their organizations.
Finally, although past research has not investigated an understanding x control
interaction, this interaction on rater attitudes toward MSFS was explored in the current
study. As presented in Tables 21 and 22, although the understanding x control
interaction did not account for significant variance in the supervisor ratings (rater
acceptance, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.22, p = .64; rater cost-benefit evaluations, ∆R2 =
.01, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.85, p = .36) and subordinate ratings samples (rater acceptance, ∆R2
= .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.77, p = .38; rater cost-benefit evaluations, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234)
= 0.51, p = .48), it did explain unique variance in rater acceptance of peer feedback
(∆R2 = .06, ∆F(1, 181) = 11.45, p = .001) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of peer
feedback (∆R2 = .10, ∆F(1, 181) = 21.14, p < .001). Although this finding was not
hypothesized, the interactions were plotted to explore the nature of these relationships.
As Figures 10 and 11 demonstrate, when participants’ perceptions of control were low,
higher levels of understanding were associated with higher reported acceptance of peer
feedback and more positive evaluations of peer feedback. However, when reported
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Table 20
Differences among Managerial Levels on Perceptions of Organizational Politics.
Managerial Level

M

SD

Upper-level
Management

Middle-level
Management

Upper-level
Management
Middle-level
Management
Lower-level
Management
Non-management

2.49

0.56

2.74

0.59

*

2.82

0.56

*

NS

2.84

0.57

*

NS

* p < .05, NS = Non-significant difference between pairs of means.
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Lowe-level
Management

NS

Table 21
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Understanding and Rater Acceptance of MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.01
-.07

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

.10
.03
.02
0.73

.14
-.06
-.14
.38*
.19
.06
2.17

-.14
-.01
-.10
.22*
.23*
.04
1.97

.19*
-.04
.06
.04
3.05

.00
.05
.07
.02
1.58

-.02*
-.04
.04
.00
0.12

.03
.06
.00
0.22

-.30
.13
.06
11.45*

-.06
.04
.00
0.77

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 22
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Understanding and Rater Cost-Benefit of MSFS
Independent Variable
Step 1
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience
Gender
R2b
Fc
Step 2
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff
Step 3
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

Supervisor
Feedback
Sample
-.10
-.02

βa
Peer Feedback
Sample

Subordinate
Feedback
Sample

.01
.08
.01
0.41

.05
-.19
-.18
.33*
.09
.05
1.90

-.16
-.14
-.06
.22*
.10
.03
1.63

.12
.05
.04
.03
2.34

.09
.07
.09
.04
3.95*

.06
.02
.04
.01
0.81

.07
.05
.01
0.85

-.32*
.10
.06
21.14*

-.04
.04
.00
0.51

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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4.0

Rater Acceptance of Peer Feedback

3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.8

Control
2.6

Low Control

2.4

Medium Control

2.2

High Control

Understanding

Reference lines represent the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 10: Understanding x Control Interaction on Rater Acceptance of Peer Feedback.
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Rater Cost-Benefit Evaluations of Peer Feedback

3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.8
2.6

Control
2.4

Low Control

2.2

Medium Control

2.0

High Control

Understanding

Reference lines represent the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 11: Understanding x Control Interaction on Rater Cost-Benefit Evaluations of
Peer Feedback.
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control was high, there was a negative relationship between understanding and both
acceptance of peer feedback and cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback. Thus, when
understanding is low, those with high control are more accepting of and have more
positive expectations for providing peer feedback than those with low control
perceptions. However, for individuals with high understanding perceptions, those with
low control report more positive rater attitudes toward peer feedback. One potential
explanation for this finding is that individuals with low perceptions of control and high
understanding of organizational processes may view providing peer feedback as an
opportunity to gain some level of control within their organizations. Conversely, those
with high feelings of control and understanding may fear losing some of their control to
coworkers who are currently disenfranchised. Future research is necessary to test these
hypotheses and explore these relationships.
As displayed in Tables 23 and 24, the understanding x control interaction also
accounted for significant variance in rater acceptance of MSFS (∆R2 = .01, ∆F(1, 531)
= 8.21, p = .004) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS (∆R2 = .02, ∆F(1, 531) =
13.63, p < .001) in the combined sample. As displayed in Figure 12 and 13, the nature
of the interaction is consistent with the understanding x control interaction in the peer
sample discussed above. When control is high, understanding is negatively related to
rater acceptance of MSFS and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS. However, when
control is low, understanding is positively related to rater attitudes toward MSFS.
Essentially, while those with high control perceptions reported more positive attitudes
toward MSFS than those with low control perceptions when understanding is low,
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Table 23
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Understanding and Rater Acceptance Evaluations of MSFS in
Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.48*
-.57*
-.07
-.05
-.10
-.11
.16
.21*
.18*
.23
17.92*

Step 2
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

-.01
.01
.23
.00
0.63

Step 3
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

-.13*
.25
.01
8.21*

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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Table 24
Hierarchical Regressions Investigating the Moderating Effect of Control on the
Relationship Between Understanding and Rater Cost-Benefit Evaluations of MSFS in
Combined Sample
Independent Variable

βa
Combined
Sample

Step 1
Supervisor Feedback
Peer Feedback
Upper-Management
Middle-Management
Lower-Management
Prior Experience—Supervisor Ratings
Prior Experience—Peer Ratings
Prior Experience—Subordinate Ratings
Gender
R2b
Fc

.47*
-.41*
-.15
-.16
-.14
-.08
.14
.23*
.09
.22
17.09*

Step 2
Understanding
Control
R2d
∆R2e
∆Ff

.06
.02
.24
.01
4.56*

Step 3
Understanding x Control
R2g
∆R2h
∆Fi

-.14*
.26
.02
13.63*

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. b R2 at Step 1. c F value at Step 1. d R2 at Step 2. e
Change in R2 from Step 1 to Step 2. f Change in F value from Step 1 to Step 2. g R2 at
Step 3. h Change in R2 from Step 2 to Step 3. i Change in F value from Step 2 to Step 3.
* p < .05
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4.1

Rater Acceptance of MSFS

4.0

3.9

3.8

3.7

3.6

Control
Low Control

3.5
Medium Control
High Control

3.4

Understanding

Reference lines represent the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 12: Understanding x Control Interaction on Rater Acceptance of MSFS in
Combined Sample.
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Rater Cost-Benefit Evaluations of MSFS

3.8

3.6

3.4

3.2

Control
3.0

Low Control
Medium Control

2.8

High Control

Understanding
Reference lines represent the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 13: Understanding x Control Interaction on Rater Cost-Benefit Evaluations of
MSFS in Combined Sample.
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participants with low control perceptions reported more positive attitudes toward MSFS
than did high control participants when understanding is high.
It should be noted that the current research found little support for the
hypothesized interactions. Because a high number of tests were conducted in the
present study, one would expect by chance a few significant findings when in reality no
true effect exists (i.e., Type I error). Thus, although the significant interactions found in
this study may represent true interaction effects, the possibility that the significant
results are due to Type I error cannot be ruled out.
Summary of Regression Analyses Results
Although the hypothesized interactions (with the exception of the perceptions of
organizational politics x understanding interaction on rater acceptance of MSFS) were
not supported by the results of the regression analyses, it should be noted that several
other predictor variables that were included in this research consistently accounted for
unique variance in rater attitudes toward MSFS. For example, Tables 25-28 display the
beta weights for the predictors that were included in significant regression models for
each sample (i.e., these tables contain the beta weights for the predictors in the first step
in each equation where the model was significant and no other additional steps
accounted for significant incremental variance). These tables reveal that perceptions of
organizational politics accounted for significant unique variance in all attitudes for all
regressions excluding the regressions that examined rater acceptance of supervisor
feedback. In fact, perceptions of organizational politics (i.e., the main effect) even
accounted for significant unique variance in addition to the variance that it contributed
to the perceptions of organizational politics x understanding interaction on rater
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Table 25
Beta Weights of Predictors Involved in Significant Regression Equations in the
Supervisor Feedback Sample
βa

Predictor
1

Acceptance
2
3

Upper-level Management
Middle-level Management
Prior Experience-Supervisor Feedback
Gender
Organizational Politics Perceptions
Understanding
Control
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
Politics x Understanding x Control

4

Cost-Benefit Evaluations
5
6
7
8
-.08
-.10
-.10
-.01
-.02
-.02
.03
.04
.03
.10
.11
.11
-.22* -.23* -.22*
.06
.03
.05
.04

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. * p < .05, significance tests refer to the step listed
below, not necessarily the final step.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Politics x Understanding Regression, no significant models.
Politics x Control Regression, no significant models.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, no significant models.
Understanding x Control Regression, no significant models.
Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, main effects model.
Understanding x Control Regression, no significant models.
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Table 26
Beta Weights of Predictors Involved in Significant Regression Equations in the Peer
Feedback Sample
βa

Predictor
Upper-level Management
Middle-level Management
Lower-level Management
Prior Experience-Peer Feedback
Gender
Organizational Politics
Perceptions
Understanding
Control
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
Politics x Understanding x
Control

1
.01
-.03
-.14
.35*
.19
-.31*

Acceptance
2
3
.02
.14
-.03
.02
-.13
-.09
.34*
.37*
.18
.18*
-.32* -.26*

.06
.03

-.05
.01
.00
.06
-.26*

4
.14
-.06
-.14
.38*
.19
.00
.05
-.30*

Cost-Benefit Evaluations
5
6
7
8
-.11
-.05
.01
.05
-.18
-.12
-.09
-.19
-.17
-.13
-.11
-.18
.27*
.28*
.31*
.33*
.07
.06
.07
.09
-.39* -.44* -.34*
.11
-.02

.03
-.05
-.02
-.07
-.32*

.09
.01
-.32*

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. * p < .05, significance tests refer to the step listed
below, not necessarily the final step.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
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Table 27
Beta Weights of Predictors Involved in Significant Regression Equations in the
Subordinate Feedback Sample
βa

Predictor
Upper-level Management
Middle-level Management
Lower-level Management
Prior Experience-Subordinate
Feedback
Gender
Organizational Politics
Perceptions
Understanding
Control
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
Politics x Understanding x
Control

1
-.25
-.04
-.08
.19

Acceptance
2
3
-.20
-.20
.00
.00
-.07
-.07
.20
.20

.26*
-.22*

.26*
-.24*

.26*
-.24*

.13
-.24*

-.01
-.07

.05

-.07

-.04

4

Cost-Benefit Evaluations
5
6
7
8
-.22
-.18
-.21
-.14
-.11
-.13
-.04
-.03
-.03
.19*
.20*
.20
.12
-.25*

.12
-.24*

-.02

.06
-.02

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. * p < .05, significance tests refer to the step listed
below, not necessarily the final step.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, main effects model.
Understanding x Control Regression, no significant models.
Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, main effects model.
Understanding x Control Regression, no significant models.
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Table 28
Beta Weights of Predictors Involved in Significant Regression Equations in the
Combined Feedback Sample
βa

Predictor
Supervisor Ratings Sample
Peer Ratings Sample
Upper-level Management
Middle-level Management
Lower-level Management
Prior Experience-Supervisor
Feedback
Prior Experience-Peer
Feedback
Prior Experience-Subordinate
Feedback
Gender
Organizational Politics
Perceptions
Understanding
Control
Politics x Understanding
Politics x Control
Understanding x Control
Politics x Understanding x
Control

1
.45*
-.53*
-.11
-.03
-.08
-.09

Acceptance
2
3
.44*
.45*
-.55* -.54*
-.12
-.07
-.02
-.03
-.07
-.09
-.12
-.09

4
.48*
-.57*
-.07
-.05
-.10
-.11

Cost-Benefit Evaluations
5
6
7
8
.43*
.43*
.44*
.47*
-.38* -.38* -.38* -.41*
-.22* -.20
-.18
-.15
-.12
-.11
-.13
-.16
-.10
-.09
-.13
-.14
-.09
-.09
-.07
-.08

.15

.16

.16

.16

.13

.14

.14

.14

.20*

.20*

.20*

.21*

.21*

.21*

.21*

.23*

.21*
-.23*

.20*
-.23*

.20*
-.23*

.18*

.11
-.30*

.11
-.31*

.11
-.30*

.09

-.04
-.03
-.09
.00
-.11*

-.01
.01

.06

.02
-.01
.08
-.09
-.14*

.06
.02

-.02
-.01
.15*

-.13*

.01

-.14*

Note: a Unstandardized Beta Weights. * p < .05, significance tests refer to the step listed
below, not necessarily the final step.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Politics x Understanding Regression, two-way interaction model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interactions model.
Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
Politics x Understanding Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Control Regression, main effects model.
Politics x Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interactions model.
Understanding x Control Regression, two-way interaction model.
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acceptance of MSFS in the combined sample (although this main effect should still be
considered subordinate to the interaction when interpreting these relationships). Thus,
while organizational politics perceptions was hypothesized to interact with
understanding and control in the prediction of rater attitudes toward MSFS, it generally
had an additive effect (rather than an interactive effect) in predicting rater attitudes. The
nature of this additive effect, as demonstrated by the set of regression analyses, is that
organizational politics perceptions are negatively related to both rater acceptance of
MSFS and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS.
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DISCUSSION
The use of multisource feedback systems (MSFS) has increased dramatically in
recent years (Church & Bracken, 1997; Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988; London &
Smithers, 1995; Wohlers & London, 1989). Because user attitudes impact the
effectiveness of performance appraisal systems (Bernardin et al., 1993; Bettenhausen &
Fedor, 1997; Carroll & Schneier, 1982), research is needed to identify the factors that
influence user attitudes toward MSFS. Accordingly, the current research examined the
effects of three potential determinants of rater acceptance and rater cost-benefit
evaluations of MSFS: organizational politics perceptions, understanding of
organizational events, and control over organizational processes. In general, the
findings of this research suggested that (a) a unidimensional model of organizational
politics perceptions and a two-factor model of rater attitudes toward MSFS provided the
best fit for the current data, (b) understanding moderates the relationship between
organizational politics perceptions and rater acceptance of MSFS, (c) control interacted
with understanding to predict rater attitudes toward peer feedback and rater attitudes
toward MSFS, (d) organizational politics perceptions had a negative influence on rater
attitudes toward MSFS (except for acceptance of supervisor feedback), (e) rater source
was significantly related to rater attitudes toward MSFS, (f) individuals with prior
experience with MSFS reported more positive attitudes toward MSFS than did
individuals who have never participated in these systems, (g) managerial level was
significantly related with perceptions of organizational politics.
Measurement Models
Due to the lack of consensus among researchers concerning the dimensionality
of the Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale (POPS) (Kacmar & Barron, 1999),
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the current research investigated the factor structure of this measure. While several
measurement studies have suggested that POPS may be a multidimensional construct
(e.g., Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar & Ferris, 1991), researchers investigating the
antecedents, correlates, and consequences of organizational politics perceptions have
generally treated this construct in a undimensional manner (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996;
Ferris, Frink, Gilmore, & Kacmar, 1994; Ferris, Harrell-Cook, & Dulebohn, 2000;
Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar, Bozeman, Carlson, & Anthony, 1999). To determine
the appropriateness of this practice, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted
to assess the fit of a one-factor model, a three-factor model, and a five-factor model of
organizational politics perceptions based on previous findings. Results in the present
study revealed that the one-factor POPS model (i.e., the unidimensional model) fit the
data significantly better than Kacmar and Ferris’s three-factor model and provided a
similar fit to their expanded five-factor model. Consequently, these results support the
prevailing use of POPS as a unidimensional construct in applied research.
The dimensionality of the scales used in the present study to measure rater
attitudes toward MSFS also was examined using CFA. Three rater attitudes were
proposed in the current research: rater acceptance of MSFS, rater perceptions of the
benefits of MSFS, and rater perceptions of the costs of MSFS. While rater acceptance
was measured using a scale created specifically for the present research, rater
perceptions of the benefits of MSFS and rater perceptions of the costs of MSFS were
assessed using adapted forms of Bettenhausen and Fedor’s (1997) Positive Appraisal
Outcomes Scale (PAOS) and Negative Appraisal Outcome Scale (NAOS), respectively.
Because previous research has not investigated the dimensionality of rater attitudes
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toward MSFS, CFA were used to determine the appropriate factor structure for these
scales in the current research. The results of the CFA revealed that, while participants
formed an independent conceptualization concerning their acceptance of MSFS, they
did not develop distinct conceptions of their positive and negative expectations for these
systems. Instead, participants expressed a single cost-benefit evaluation of MSFS. This
suggests that researchers should not treat these variables separately and that using them
as separate variables is redundant. Accordingly, the current research treated acceptance
of MSFS as an independent attitude, while rater positive and negative expectations for
MSFS were treated as polar ends of the same construct.
Perceived Organizational Politics x Understanding Interaction
The results of the current research provided limited support for the hypothesized
interaction between understanding and organizational politics perceptions on rater
acceptance of MSFS. The regression analysis investigating this interaction in the
combined sample indicated that the relationship between organizational politics
perceptions and rater acceptance of MSFS is more negative for individuals reporting
low understanding than for those reporting high understanding. This result suggests
that, in highly political organizations, individuals with low understanding report lower
levels of acceptance of MSFS than individuals with high understanding. A possible
explanation for this result is that, while both groups may feel that the presence of
organizational politics makes the potential negative outcomes of participating in MSFS
more likely, those with a higher understanding of organizational events may feel that
they are better equipped to navigate the heightened political environment and avoid
potential political pitfalls than individuals with lower understanding. Thus, in highly
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political organizations, individuals high in understanding are more likely to accept
MSFS and view rater participation as an opportunity than as a threat when compared to
low understanding individuals.
Understanding x Control Interaction
An interesting finding in the current research was an understanding x control
interaction for rater acceptance of peer feedback and rater cost-benefit evaluations of
peer feedback. This interaction was also significant in the combined sample for both
rater acceptance of and rater cost-benefit evaluations. The results indicate that for
individuals who report high levels of control, understanding was negatively related to
rater acceptance of peer feedback. Conversely, the relationship between understanding
and rater acceptance of peer feedback was positive when control is low. Individuals
with low perceptions of control and high understanding of organizational processes may
have viewed providing peer feedback as an opportunity to gain some level of control
within their organizations. On the other hand, those with high feelings of control and
understanding may view MSFS as a threat to their power because these systems provide
a voice to those who currently have little say in organizational decisions. Interestingly,
this interaction was found in the peer feedback sample, but not in the supervisor or
subordinate feedback samples (although it was also found in the combined sample).
Perhaps these issues are more salient in regard to peer feedback because the raters and
ratees are in more direct competition for resources, rewards, and promotions than is the
case with supervisor or subordinate feedback. Future research is necessary to test these
hypotheses and explore these relationships.
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Perceptions of Organizational Politics
It should be noted that while only one of the hypothesized interactions involving
perceptions of organizational politics received support in the current research, a
consistent finding was that organizational politics perceptions accounted for significant
unique variance in rater attitudes toward MSFS. That is, in general, perceptions of
organizational politics may have an additive rather than a multiplicative effect. In
effect, perceptions of organizational politics were associated with lower acceptance of
MSFS and with less positive cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS. Thus, while previous
research found that understanding and control moderate organizational politics
perceptions-outcome relationships (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris et al., 1994; Ferris et
al., 2000), the current study found that organizational politics perceptions was
negatively related to rater attitudes toward MSFS regardless of one’s level of
understanding or control. One potential explanation for these findings is that while
understanding and control may influence the opportunity/threat status of organizational
politics perceptions in regard to general job attitudes and behaviors (e.g., job anxiety,
job satisfaction, political behavior), organizational politics perceptions may be more
likely to be interpreted as threatening in the context of organizational systems that are
traditionally tied to rewards and punishments (e.g., performance appraisal, selection and
promotional systems). Accordingly, understanding and control may not play as
important a role in framing whether organizational politics are perceived as
opportunities or threats in the context of performance appraisal because, in these
situations, organizational politics are overwhelmingly viewed as a threat.
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One exception to the finding discussed above was that perceptions of
organizational politics were not significantly related to rater acceptance of supervisor
feedback. While rater expectations (i.e., cost-benefit evaluations) concerning
supervisor feedback were significantly less positive for individuals reporting heightened
levels of organizational politics than for individuals reporting lower levels of
organizational politics, rater acceptance of supervisor feedback was not negatively
impacted by perceptions of organizational politics. A potential explanation for this
finding is that because supervisor feedback is the most prevalent source of performance
feedback (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), supervisors may consider it to be part of their
job duties regardless of whether they expect positive or negative outcomes.
Consequently, although supervisors in highly political organizations might expect
supervisor feedback to result in less positive outcomes than individuals in less political
organizations, these perceptions may not influence their acceptance of supervisor
feedback because they understand that providing feedback to their subordinates falls
within their job responsibilities.
Rater Source
The results of the current research indicate that, in general, participants reported
rater acceptance and rater cost-benefit evaluations above the midpoint for each rater
source. However, rater source (i.e., supervisor feedback, peer feedback, subordinate
feedback) was found to account for significant differences in both rater acceptance and
rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS. Rater acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations
were most positive for supervisor feedback, followed by subordinate feedback, followed
by peer feedback, respectively. Because supervisor feedback is the most common
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source of performance feedback (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), it is not surprising that it
is the most accepted form of feedback as well. One potential explanation for the finding
that subordinate feedback is viewed more positively than peer feedback may stem from
the fact that while organizations often have policies in place to protect subordinates
from supervisor retaliation, policies protecting employees from coworker retaliation are
relatively rare (Fedor et al., 1999). Peer feedback may therefore carry more perceived
risk. Alternatively, subordinates may be more accepting of MSFS (and have more
positive expectations) because what a supervisor does directly impacts their jobs, while
the performance of peers may have little personal relevance for the rater. Thus, the
results of the current research indicate that individuals develop separate attitudes toward
each type of rater source and that attitudes toward one source may not necessarily
generalize to other sources.
Prior Experience with MSFS
Participants in the current study who reported having previous experience
providing peer and subordinate feedback reported higher levels of acceptance and more
positive cost-benefit evaluations for these feedback sources than participants without
such experience. Thus, as the use of MSFS increases, differences among rater sources
is likely to diminish. It may be that fear of the new and unknown drives the differences
between rater attitudes toward supervisor feedback and alternative feedback sources.
Consequently, rater acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS likely become
more positive as raters participate in MSFS and become more comfortable with their
roles as raters. This finding has two important implications. First, organizations that
implement MSFS are likely to find the highest level of resistance among individuals
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who have never participated in MSFS. Accordingly, training programs designed to
expose individuals to MSFS and provide experience making performance ratings may
reduce the level of resistance among those with little familiarity with MSFS. Second,
acceptance of MSFS is likely to increase as users gain experience with peer and
subordinate feedback. Thus, resistance to MSFS is likely to decrease over time.
Managerial Level and Perceptions of Organizational Politics
Ferris et al.’s (1989) model of organizational politics posits that hierarchical
level is positively related to organizational politics perceptions. However, the research
investigating this relationship has been mixed (Kacmar & Barron, 1999). In the current
research, managerial level was found to be significantly related to perceptions of
organizational politics. Pairwise comparisons revealed that upper-level managers
perceived significantly less political behavior than did middle-level managers, lowerlevel managers, and non-managers. This finding may be explained by the observation
that, while political behavior may be more frequent at higher levels of organizations,
upper-level managers may not perceive these behaviors as political (Parker et al., 1995).
Conversely, individuals at lower levels of the organization, who do not have access to
all of the information used by upper-management to make organizational decisions,
may attribute political motivations to behaviors when they do not understand the
rationale behind those behaviors.
Implications and Contributions of the Current Research
The current study builds on the existing research literature in several important
ways. First, although several studies have investigated the determinants of ratee (e.g.,
Antonioni, 1994; Bernardin et al., 1993; Maurer & Tarulli, 1996) and general user (i.e.,
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both ratees and raters combined) (Bettenhausen & Fedor; Fedor et al., 1999; Funderburg
& Levy, 1997) attitudes toward MSFS, little research has focused specifically on rater
attitudes. Research designed to increase our knowledge concerning the factors that
influence rater attitudes toward MSFS is critical because rater attitudes likely influence
the accuracy of performance ratings in MSFS (c.f., Farr & Newman, 2001; Fedor et al.,
1999; Gilliland & Langdon, 1998). However, little is currently known about the
determinants of rater attitudes. The current research contributes to the literature by
demonstrating that raters’ perceptions of organizational politics, understanding, and
control impact their acceptance of and expectations for MSFS. Accordingly, this
research indicates that researchers and practitioners can better predict and influence
rater attitudes toward MSFS by assessing and impacting the level of understanding,
control, and organizational politics perceptions of individuals within an organization.
This knowledge could then be used to predict possible sources of resistance to MSFS
and to frame the implementation of MSFS in a manner that addresses potential
concerns.
Second, although several researchers have demonstrated that organizational
politics play a prominent role in the performance appraisal process (e.g., Ferris et al.,
1989; Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al., 1987; Riley, 1983), this is the
first research to examine the relationships between organizational politics perceptions
and attitudes toward MSFS. Because user attitudes are essential for the success of
performance feedback systems (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Bernardin et al., 1993;
Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Carroll & Schneier, 1982; Fedor et al., 1999; Funderburg
& Levy, 1997; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), the results of this study can be a valuable
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guide for practitioners in the implementation of MSFS. For example, the current
findings suggest that, in highly political organizations, there is likely to be resistance to
the implementation of MSFS. Consequently, interventions aimed at reducing
organizational politics (e.g., increasing organizational communication, formalizing
organizational policies and procedures) and increasing acceptance of MSFS (e.g., rater
training programs, MSFS orientation programs, reward systems that are consistent with
MSFS, informational meetings with rater groups) should be considered before
implementing MSFS in political environments.
Third, Ferris and Kacmar (1992) identified the need for future research
investigating the moderating influences of control and understanding on perceptions of
organizational politics. While several subsequent studies have investigated the
moderating influences of understanding and control independently (Ferris et al., 1993;
Ferris et al., 1996a; Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris et al., 1994; Gilmore et al., 1996), the
current research is the first study to explore the joint effects (i.e., a three-way
interaction) of understanding and control on the relationships between organizational
politics perceptions and outcomes important to organizations. Because two-way
interactions are conditional upon a third predictor variable when a three-way interaction
is present, conclusions based on research that fails to investigate the three-way
interaction risk being overly simplistic or incomplete. Although the current research
did not find evidence for a three-way interaction, it represents the first attempt to
investigate the joint effects of understanding and control on organizational politics
perceptions-outcome relationships. Thus, future research examining the relationships
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between organizational politics perceptions and organizational or individual outcomes
should also investigate the joint moderating effect of understanding and control.
Fourth, the current research demonstrated that individuals with prior experience
providing peer or subordinate feedback are likely to have more positive rater attitudes
toward MSFS than individuals without such experience. This finding suggests that
many of the concerns expressed by individuals without prior experience with MSFS
may be unfounded (or at least not as serious as expected). As individuals participate in
MSFS, rater attitudes are likely to become more positive. Accordingly, because rater
attitudes impact the success of performance appraisal systems (Bernardin & Beatty,
1984; Bernardin et al., 1993; Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Carroll & Schneier, 1982;
Fedor et al., 1999; Funderburg & Levy, 1997; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), the
effectiveness of MSFS is likely to increase over time as rater acceptance and rater
expectations increase.
Fifth, the CFAs that were used to evaluate the measurement models in the
current research have important implications for future research in the areas of both
organizational politics and MSFS. For example, although prior research concerning the
dimensionality of the POPS has been inconsistent (e.g., Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar
& Ferris, 1991; Nye & Witt, 1993), researchers have generally treated it in a
unidimensional manner (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996; Ferris, Frink, Gilmore, & Kacmar,
1994; Ferris, Harrell-Cook, & Dulebohn, 2000; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar,
Bozeman, Carlson, & Anthony, 1999). The current study found that a unidimensional
model fit the current data better than a three-dimensional model and similarly to a fivedimensional model, providing additional support for the use of the POPS as a
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unidimentional measure. This research also demonstrated that respondents did not
distinguish between the items on the PAOS and NAOS scales, suggesting that raters
form a general cost-benefit evaluation of MSFS rather than separate attitudes toward the
benefits and costs of these systems. Thus, future research on rater attitudes toward
MSFS should avoid using these scales to represent separate constructs.
Sixth, the current research found that rater source is an important determinant of
rater attitudes toward MSFS. As such, attitudes toward one source should not be
generalized to other sources (i.e., just because an individual accepts subordinate
feedback does not necessarily mean that the individual will also accept peer feedback).
The results of this research demonstrate that raters develop distinct attitudes toward
each type of feedback and that these attitudes are generally most positive for supervisor
feedback, followed by peer feedback, followed by subordinate feedback. Accordingly,
future research should examine each source separately and not use one source as a
proxy for another.
Limitations
Four potential limitations of this research should be noted. First, the research
design utilized in this study was cross-sectional in nature. Consequently, causality
cannot be inferred. While the hypotheses in this research assumed that organizational
politics perceptions influenced rater attitudes toward MSFS, it is possible that the
reverse (or reciprocal) relationships are present. Future longitudinal research is needed
to establish causal links among the variables used in this study.
Another limitation is that this study assesses participant attitudes toward MSFS
in a purely research context. In effect, while participants were asked to “imagine” that
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their organization was implementing a MSFS, they were not in reality faced with this
situation. It is possible that individuals responded in a different manner to these
hypothetical scenarios than they would have to the prospect of their organization
actually implementing a MSFS. Consequently, future research examining these
relationships in a field setting is warranted.
A third potential limitation is that the current research did not examine
additional contextual considerations (e.g., trust, organizational size, purpose) that might
influence the hypothesized relationships. For example, it is possible that the influence
of perceptions of organizational politics on rater attitudes toward MSFS may be
stronger in situations where these ratings are being used for administrative purposes as
opposed to developmental purposes. Accordingly, future research should examine how
these contextual factors impact the relationship between organizational politics
perceptions and rater attitudes toward MSFS.
A fourth potential limitation is that because the current study utilized a diverse
organizational sample, differences between organizations may have obscured the
hypothesized results. While the wide array of organizations included in this study
increase the generalizability of the results, it is possible that the hypothesized
interactions are only present in specific industries or types of organizations.
Accordingly, additional research using more narrowly defined samples is needed to
increase our understanding of the relationships examined in this study.
Future Research
In conclusion, there are several lines of future research that should be pursued.
First, the investigation of potential determinants of rater attitudes toward MSFS is an
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area in the research literature that has been relatively unexplored. The current study
represents a starting point for future research examining the impact of organizational
politics perceptions on rater attitudes toward non-traditional rater sources (i.e., peer
feedback, subordinate feedback). Further research is needed to investigate other
potential determinants of rater attitudes toward MSFS. Second, the influence of
understanding, control, and organizational politics perceptions on other attitudes toward
MSFS should be explored (e.g., ratee attitudes, usefulness of MSFS ratings, fairness of
MSFS). Third, the current study contributes to the growing body of research examining
the influence of organizational politics perceptions on organizational and individual
outcomes. This is the first research to examine the impact of organizational politics
perceptions on attitudes toward MSFS. Future research is needed to extend the network
of relationships between organizational politics perceptions and other outcomes valued
by organizations. Fourth, longitudinal studies are needed to explore the relationship
between MSFS and organizational politics perceptions over time. The current research
investigated the role of organizational politics perceptions as an initial determinant of
attitudes toward MSFS. However, because MSFS allow greater user participation and
may thus be perceived as more fair, it is possible that, over time, the use of MSFS may
reduce the level of politics perceptions within an organization. Longitudinal research is
needed to explore these relationships.
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APPENDIX A: SCALE ITEMS AND RESPONSE OPTIONS
Perceived Organizational Politics
1. Favoritism rather than merit determines who gets ahead around here.
2. There is no place for yes-men around here; good ideas are desired even when it
means disagreeing with superiors. (RS)
3. You can get along here by being a good guy, regardless of the quality of your work.
4. Employees are encouraged to speak out frankly even when they are critical of wellestablished ideas. (RS)
5. There are “cliques” or “in-groups” which hinder the effectiveness around here.
6. It normally takes only a couple of months for a new employee to figure out who
they should not cross around here.
7. You can usually get what you want around here if you know the right person to ask.
8. When objective standards are not specified, it is common to see many people trying
to define standards to meet their needs.
9. There has always been an influential group in this department that no one ever
crosses.
10. Generally, people who have left this organization did so because they realized that
just working hard was not enough to get ahead.
11. People here usually don’t speak up for fear of retaliation by others.
12. It seems that the individuals who are able to come through in the times of crisis or
uncertainty are the ones who get ahead. (RS)
13. As long as the actions of others don’t directly affect me, I don’t care what they do.
14. When my supervisor communicates with me, it is to make himself/herself look
better, not to help me.
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15. The old saying that the “squeaky wheel gets the grease” really works around here
when resources are distributed.
16. Rewards come only to those who work hard in this organization. (RS)
17. People who are willing to voice their opinion seem to do “better” here than those
who don’t. (RS)
18. Promotions in this department generally go to top performers. (RS)
19. My coworkers help themselves, not others.
20. I have seen people deliberately distort information requested by others for purposes
of personal gain, either by withholding it or by selectively reporting it.
21. Managers in this organization often use the selection system to hire only people that
can help them in their future or who see things the way they do.
22. People in this organization often use the selection system to hire only people that
can help them in their future or who see things the way they do.
23. I have seen changes made in policies here that only serve the purposes of a few
individuals, not the work unit or the organization.
24. Overall, the rules and policies around here concerning promotion and pay are
specific and well defined. (RS)
25. The rules and policies concerning promotion and pay are fair; it is how supervisors
carry out the policies that is unfair and self-serving.
26. When you need help at work, you can always rely on a co-worker to lend a hand.
(RS)
27. Connections with other departments are very helpful when it comes time to call in a
favor.
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28. Whereas a lot of what my supervisor does around here (e.g., communicates and
gives feedback, etc.) appears to be directed at helping employees, it is actually
intended to protect himself/herself.
29. The performance appraisals/ratings people receive from their supervisors reflect
more of the supervisor’s “own agenda” (e.g., likes and dislikes, giving high or low
ratings to make themselves look good, etc.) than the actual performance of the
employee.
30. If a coworker offers to lend some assistance, it is because they expect to get
something out of it (e.g., makes them look good, you owe them a favor now, etc.),
not because they really care.
31. Pay and promotion policies are generally communicated in this company. (RS)

Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
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Understanding
1. To what extent do you know why others at work act as they do?
2. To what extent do you understand the reason organizational changes occur?
3. To what extent do you understand the reasons why job-related decisions are made?
4. To what extent do you understand how your organization works?
5. To what extent do you understand why most things happen in your organization?
6. To what extent do you know what information your employer uses when making
decisions?

Response options range from 1 = very little to 7 = a great extent.
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Control
1. To what extent do you have influence over the things that affect you on the job?
2. To what extent do you have input in deciding what tasks or parts of tasks you will
do?
3. To what extent do you have the opportunity to take part in making job-related
decisions that affect you?
4. To what extent can you set your own work deadlines?
5. To what extent does your job allow you the opportunity for independent thought and
action?
6. To what extent do you control the pace and scheduling of your work?

Response options range from 1 = very little to 7 = a great extent.
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Acceptance of Multisource Feedback
1. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback is an appropriate way to evaluate
(subordinate/coworker/supervisor) performance.
2. If given a choice, I would choose not to provide feedback to my
(subordinates/coworkers/supervisors). (RS)
3. I feel that feedback information from (supervisors/peers/subordinates) should be
considered when evaluating (subordinate/coworker/supervisor) performance.
4. Having (supervisors/peers/subordinates) provide feedback for their
(subordinates/coworkers/supervisor) would be a mistake. (RS)
5. I consider (supervisor/peer/subordinate) feedback to be an acceptable way to
evaluate (subordinate/coworker/supervisor) performance.
6. I would prefer not to have to provide performance ratings to my
(subordinates/coworkers/supervisor). (RS)
7. Feedback information from (supervisors/peers/subordinates) should be included
in performance feedback systems.
8. In general, I feel that providing (subordinates/coworkers/supervisors) with
(supervisor/peer/subordinate) feedback is a good idea.
9. If I were in charge of my organization, I would make sure that
(supervisor/peer/subordinate) feedback was included in my organization’s
performance feedback system.

Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

112

Rater Perceptions of the Benefits of Multisource Feedback Systems
1. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would provide quality feedback to
recipients.
2. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would give employees a sense of
participation in the appraisal system.
3. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would help employees do their jobs better.
4. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would increase productivity of the work
unit.
5. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would increase employees’ feelings of
importance to the company.
6. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would add an important dimension to the
performance appraisal system.
7. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would be an appropriate part of employees’
jobs.

Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
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Rater Perceptions of the Costs of Multisource Feedback Systems
1. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would jeopardize working relationships.
2. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would foster defensive reactions on the part
of employees.
3. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would make employees feel vulnerable to
retribution.
4. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would create a popularity contest.
5. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would undermine supervisor authority.
6. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would make
(subordinates/coworkers/supervisors) overly concerned about pleasing each other.
7. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would make employees afraid to tell the
truth about (subordinates’/coworkers’/supervisors’) performance.
8. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would (create a situation where the hardest
working, most productive workers are downgraded because the supervisor fears
being replaced/create a situation where the hardest working, most productive
workers are downgraded because of jealousy/create a situation where the hardest
working, most demanding supervisors are downgraded for pushing subordinates too
hard).
9. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would overstep the boundary of what
employees should do as part of their jobs.
10. (Supervisor/Peer/Subordinate) feedback would make employees feel uncomfortable.

Response options scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
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APPENDIX B: LETTER TO STUDENTS
Instructions to Students:
1. Thank you for participating in the data collection of this study.
2. The population of this study is (individuals in managerial positions/full-time
working adults) who are not students.
3. Locate (an individual in a managerial position/a full-time working adult) who is
not a student who you think may be interested in participating in this study.
4. Inform that person of the following:
a. The purpose of this study is to assess the participant’s views and
attitudes toward providing (supervisor/peer/subordinate) feedback.
b. If they agree to participate, they should fill out the questionnaire.
c. After completing the questionnaire, they should enclose it in the postagepaid return envelope and mail the survey to the researchers.
5. Thank the individual for participating.
6. You should fill out the bottom of this form in order to receive extra credit.
Extra-credit:
1. In order to receive extra-credit, you must complete and return this page.
2. You will only receive extra-credit if the questionnaire is returned.
3. No extra-credit will be given for surveys received after __________.
Your name:

__________________________________________________

Your SS#:

__________________________________________________

Professor’s name:

____________________________________________

Course and section number: ______________________________________
Who did you give the questionnaire packet to? (all info is required so that authenticity
of responses may be verified if necessary)
Name: _______________________________________
Phone: _______________________________________
Organization: _________________________________
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APPENDIX C: LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS
Dear Participant,
We are soliciting your participation in a research study and hope you will agree
to take about 10 to 15 minutes of your time to complete this questionnaire. The purpose
of this study is to explore employee attitudes regarding their organization and how
individuals feel about the prospect of providing performance ratings for their
(subordinates/peers/supervisors). Your participation is entirely voluntary, and all
responses are confidential. Data gathered in this study will be used only for research
purposes. Completion of this questionnaire constitutes your informed consent to
participate in this study. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this
questionnaire, please contact John M. Ford, at Louisiana State University, Department
of Psychology, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, or by phone at 225-388-4233. You also may
contact Dr. Robert Mathews, Chairman, Institutional Review Board at Louisiana State
University, Department of Psychology, Baton Rouge, LA 70803. Please complete this
questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope by ________________. Thank
you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your help is greatly appreciated.
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APPENDIX D: INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS CONCERNING
MULTISOURCE FEEDBACK ITEMS
The use of multisource feedback systems (MSFS) is becoming increasingly
popular in organizations. MSFS are a special type of performance appraisal in which
the employee who is being evaluated receives performance ratings from a variety of
different individuals within the organization. Raters often include the employee’s
supervisor, coworkers, and subordinates. Regardless of what type of performance
feedback system your organization currently uses, we would like you to imagine that
your organization is implementing a multisource feedback system. In this system,
performance ratings will be collected from an employee’s immediate supervisor,
coworkers, and direct subordinates. The performance ratings provided by these rater
sources will only be used to supply the rated employee with information for his/her own
development.
Second paragraph of instructions for supervisor feedback questionnaires:
Imagine that once the multisource feedback system is designed and
implemented, you have been asked to provide performance ratings for your
subordinates. By subordinates, we are referring to individuals who report directly to
you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the statements below
using the following scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree

3 = Neutral

4 = Agree

5 = Strongly

Agree
Second paragraph of instructions for peer feedback questionnaires:
Imagine that once the multisource feedback system is designed and
implemented, you have been asked to provide performance ratings for your peers. By
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peers, we are referring to individuals with whom you work who are at about the same
rank or organizational level as yourself. Keep in mind that the ratings you provide will
be combined with the ratings of other peers before they are given to the individual being
evaluated. In other words, the average and range of all peer ratings (and not your
specific rating) will be shared with the person being evaluated (e.g., “the average rating
provided by your peers was _____, with a ___ being the lowest rating you received and
a ___ being the highest rating you received”). Please indicate the extent to which you
agree with each of the statements below using the following scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree

3 = Neutral

4 = Agree

5 = Strongly

Agree
Second paragraph of instructions for subordinate questionnaires:
Imagine that once the multisource feedback system is designed and
implemented, you have been asked to provide performance ratings for your supervisor.
By supervisor, we are referring to the individual to whom you directly report. Keep in
mind that the ratings you provide will be combined with the ratings of other
subordinates before they are given to the individual being evaluated. In other words,
the average and range of all subordinate ratings (and not your specific rating) will be
shared with the person being evaluated (e.g., “the average rating provided by your
subordinates was _____, with a ___ being the lowest rating you received and a ___
being the highest rating you received”). Please indicate the extent to which you agree
with each of the statements below using the following scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree

3 = Neutral

Agree
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4 = Agree

5 = Strongly

APPENDIX E: TESTLETS FOR CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSES
Hypothesized Model Testlets
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
BEN1: Benefits items 1, 3, 7
BEN2: Benefits items 2, 6
BEN3: Benefits items 4, 5
COST1: Costs items 3, 4, 9
COST2: Costs items 1, 6, 10
COST3: Costs items 2, 5
COST4: Costs items 7, 8
Alternative Model 1 Testlets
GEN1: POPS items 5, 7, 15
GEN2: POPS items 19, 26, 30
GEN3: POPS items 9, 23, 25
GEN4: POPS items 11, 14, 27
GEN5: POPS items 8, 20, 22
GEN6: POPS items 28, 29
GEN7: POPS items 13, 21
GET1: POPS items 1, 10, 12
GET2: POPS items 4, 16, 17
GET3: POPS items 2, 18
GET4: POPS items 3, 6
PAY1: POPS items 24, 31
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
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CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
BEN1: Benefits items 1, 3, 7
BEN2: Benefits items 2, 6
BEN3: Benefits items 4, 5
COST1: Costs items 3, 4, 9
COST2: Costs items 1, 6, 10
COST3: Costs items 2, 5
COST4: Costs items 7, 8
Alternative Model 2 Testlets
GEN1: POPS items 8, 22, 23
GEN2: POPS items 9, 11, 15
GEN3: POPS items 5, 7, 20
GEN4: POPS items 13, 27
GET1: POPS items 1, 10, 12
GET2: POPS items 3, 16, 18
GET3: POPS items 2, 4
GET4: POPS items 6, 17
COW1: POPS items 19, 26, 30
SUP1: POPS items 14, 21, 29
SUP2: POPS items 25, 28
PAY1: POPS items 24, 31
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
BEN1: Benefits items 1, 3, 7
BEN2: Benefits items 2, 6
BEN3: Benefits items 4, 5
COST1: Costs items 3, 4, 9
COST2: Costs items 1, 6, 10
COST3: Costs items 2, 5
COST4: Costs items 7, 8
Alternative Model 3 Testlets
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
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POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
POW1: Understanding items 2, 6, Control item 6
POW2: Understanding items 4, 5, Control item 2
POW3: Understanding item 1, Control items 1, 3
POW4: Understanding item 3, Control items 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
BEN1: Benefits items 1, 3, 7
BEN2: Benefits items 2, 6
BEN3: Benefits items 4, 5
COST1: Costs items 3, 4, 9
COST2: Costs items 1, 6, 10
COST3: Costs items 2, 5
COST4: Costs items 7, 8
Alternative Model 4 Testlets
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
POW1: Understanding items 2, 6, Control item 6
POW2: Understanding items 4, 5, Control item 2
POW3: Understanding item 1, Control items 1, 3
POW4: Understanding item 3, Control items 4, 5
ATT1: Acceptance item 8, Benefits item 5, Costs item 1
ATT2: Acceptance item 4, Benefits item 3, Costs item 7
ATT3: Acceptance item 9, Benefits item 7, Costs item 5
ATT4: Acceptance item 1, Benefits item 2, Costs item 9
ATT5: Acceptance item 6, Benefits item 6, Costs item 6
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ATT6: Acceptance item 5, Benefits item 4, Costs item 10
ATT7: Acceptance item 3, Benefits item 1, Costs item 8
ATT8: Acceptance item 2, Costs items 3, 4
ATT9: Acceptance item 7, Costs item 2
Alternative Model 5 Testlets
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
COST1: Costs items 3, 4, 9
COST2: Costs items 1, 6, 10
COST3: Costs items 2, 5
COST4: Costs items 7, 8
POS1: Acceptance item 7, Benefits items 1, 3
POS2: Acceptance items 4, 6, Benefits item 6
POS3: Acceptance items 5, 8, Benefits item 5
POS4: Acceptance items 1, 2, Benefits item 2
POS5: Acceptance item 3, Benefits item 7
POS6: Acceptance item 9, Benefits item 4
Alternative Model 6 Testlets
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
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POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
CB1: Benefits item 4, Costs items 6, 8
CB2: Benefits item 5, Costs items 4, 10
CB3: Benefits item 3, Costs items 1, 7
CB4: Benefits item 6, Costs items 2, 5
CB5: Benefits items 1, 7, Costs item 3
CB6: Benefits item 2, Costs item 9
Alternative Model 7
POPS1: POPS items 1, 11, 19
POPS2: POPS items 6, 13, 31
POPS3: POPS items 18, 23, 24
POPS4: POPS items 4, 22, 30
POPS5: POPS items 3, 26, 27
POPS6: POPS items 5, 12, 25
POPS7: POPS items 7, 16, 28
POPS8: POPS items 2, 8, 29
POPS9: POPS items 9, 10, 14
POPS10: POPS items 15, 17
POPS11: POPS items 20, 21
UND1: Understanding items 3, 5, 6
UND2: Understanding items 1, 2, 4
CONT1: Control items 1, 2, 6
CONT2: Control items 3, 4, 5
ACC1: Acceptance items 2, 3, 6
ACC2: Acceptance items 4, 5, 9
ACC3: Acceptance items 1, 7, 8
CB1: Benefits item 4, Costs items 6, 8
CB2: Benefits item 5, Costs items 4, 10
CB3: Benefits item 3, Costs items 1, 7
CB4: Benefits item 6, Costs items 2, 5
CB5: Benefits items 1, 7, Costs item 3
CB6: Benefits item 2, Costs item 9
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